A comparison of CEO pay-performance sensitivity -Korean listed firms and U.S. listed firms
- Title
- A comparison of CEO pay-performance sensitivity -Korean listed firms and U.S. listed firms
- Author
- 오영옥
- Alternative Author(s)
- 오영옥
- Advisor(s)
- 이창민
- Issue Date
- 2021. 2
- Publisher
- 한양대학교
- Degree
- Master
- Abstract
- In South Korea, disclosure rules for executive compensation were strengthened more
vigorously after the FISCMA (Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act) was
issued in 2013. The new law also requires South Korean listed companies to disclose
compensation information about the pay of registered directors whose income more than 500
million won a year. Using the first set of individual compensation and public data for senior
executives in South Korea, we documented direct evidence on the level, construction, and
mechanisms of CEO remuneration in South Korea and performed a matched sample to
comparisons between Korea and the United States. Compared with recent research showing
that international differences in chief executive officer compensation have vanished mainly
since the mid-2000s, our findings show that there are some differences between the Korean and
the U.S. systems that are difficult to explain in terms of traditional incentive contracts. In South
Korea, by contrast, chief executives are paid mainly in salary and bonuses. Option grants and
long-term incentives are less important. The pay-performance sensitivity of South Korean
CEOs is not as high as in the United States
- URI
- https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/159885http://hanyang.dcollection.net/common/orgView/200000485327
- Appears in Collections:
- GRADUATE SCHOOL[S](대학원) > BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION(경영학과) > Theses (Master)
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