회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 투자비효율성과 자본투자 시장이상현상에 미치는 영향

Abstract

본 논문은 기업의 내부와 외부환경인 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 유형자산 투자로 측정되는 자본투자(Capital Investment)의 투자비효율성과 자본투자 시장이상현상(Capital Investment Anomaly)을 완화하는지 여부를 분석하고, 기업의 외부환경인 경쟁강도 수준에 따라 회계정보의 역할이 다르게 나타나는지를 검증한다. 자본투자는 투자금액이 크고 장기간에 걸쳐 기업 가치에 영향을 미치며 일단 자본투자를 진행하면 번복이 어렵기 때문에 신중하게 결정되어야 하지만, 경영자의 기회주의적 행동과 정보비대칭 등으로 인하여 투자비효율성이 발생할 수 있다. 또한, 자본투자는 기업 가치를 증가시키기 위하여 수행됨에도 불구하고 자본투자 이후기간에 주가가 하락하는 자본투자 시장이상현상이 보고되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 먼저, 기업 내부에서 작성되는 회계정보의 질이 자본투자의 비효율성을 완화한다는 국내외 선행연구 결과를 확장하여, 기업의 외부환경인 경쟁강도가 기업의 비효율적인 자본투자를 완화하는지 검증하고, 경쟁강도의 높고 낮음에 따라서 회계정보의 질이 투자비효율성을 완화하는 효과가 다르게 나타나는지 여부를 분석한다. 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도는 경영자의 자본투자 결정에 대한 모니터링을 강화하고 효율적인 자본투자를 하지 않으면 생존하기 어려운 환경적 요인으로 인하여 경영자의 기회주의적 행동을 감소시킴으로써 투자비효율성을 완화할 것으로 기대된다. 또한, 경쟁강도가 낮은 산업에서는 자본투자의 효율성과 관련하여 기업의 외부환경이 적절하게 기능하지 못하기 때문에 회계정보의 역할이 추가적으로 나타날 것으로 기대된다. 이어서, 자본투자의 비효율성을 완화하는 것으로 확인된 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 각각 자본투자 시장이상현상을 완화하는지 여부를 검증하고, 자본투자 시장이상현상을 완화함에 있어서 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 상호 보완적인 역할을 하는지 분석한다. 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도는 기업의 내부와 외부에서 경영자와 투자자 사이의 정보비대칭을 완화하고 공시환경을 개선한다. 따라서, 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 높은 환경에서는 자본투자 시장이상현상이 완화될 것으로 기대된다. 또한, 기업의 투자비효율성 완화효과와 마찬가지로 기업의 외부환경인 경쟁강도가 공시환경을 개선하지 못하는 경우에는 기업 내부의 회계정보가 정보환경을 개선함으로써 자본투자 시장이상현상을 완화시킬 것으로 기대된다. 본 논문은 2000년부터 2010년의 유가증권시장을 분석대상으로 하였으며, 기대 자본투자수준과 실제 자본투자의 차이(절대값)를 투자비효율성으로 정의하고, 선행연구에서 사용되는 4가지 측정치를 평균하여 회계정보의 질을 산정하였고 허핀달허쉬만지수(HHI)를 이용하여 경쟁강도를 측정하였다. 본 논문의 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도는 각각 자본투자의 비효율성을 완화하는 것으로 나타났다. 회계정보의 질이 높은 경우 경영자가 투자안을 더욱 명확하게 판단할 수 있고 자본투자 결정에 대해 이사회의 모니터링이 강화되며, 높은 경쟁강도의 산업에서는 높아진 청산위험으로 인하여 효율적인 자본투자결정이 불가피해지기 때문에 효율적인 자본투자를 유도하는 것으로 해석된다. 둘째, 경쟁강도가 낮은 산업에서 회계정보의 질이 추가적으로 투자비효율성을 완화하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 자본투자와 관련하여 기업의 외부 지배구조인 경쟁강도가 작동하지 않는 상황에서 회계정보의 역할이 부각되는 것으로 해석된다. 셋째, 자본투자의 시장이상현상은 회계정보의 질이 낮거나 경쟁강도가 낮은 산업에서 크게 나타났다. 회계정보의 질 또는 경쟁강도가 높은 환경에서는 효율적인 자본투자가 이루어질 가능성이 높고 투명한 정보환경으로 인하여 자본투자에 대한 주가반응이 적시에 이루어지지만, 그렇지 않은 경우에는 자본투자에 대한 시장의 판단이 투자시점에 충분히 반영되지 않아서 자본투자 이후에 추가적으로 주가가 하락하는 것으로 해석된다. 넷째, 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 모두 낮은 상황에서 자본투자 시장이상현상이 크게 나타났다. 기업의 내부와 외부 정보환경인 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도의 상호 보완적인 역할로 인하여 어느 하나라도 잘 작동하면 투명한 정보환경이 조성되지만, 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 모두 작동하지 않는 상황에서는 불투명한 정보환경으로 인해 자본투자 시장이상현상이 크게 발생하는 것으로 해석된다. 본 논문의 공헌점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 자본투자의 투자비효율성을 완화함에 있어서 기존연구에서 주로 다루어진 회계정보의 질에서 나아가서, 산업특성인 경쟁강도가 투자비효율성을 완화하며, 회계정보의 질이 투자비효율성을 완화하는 역할이 기업의 외부환경인 경쟁강도에 따라 다르게 나타날 수 있음을 확인했다는 점에서 차별점이 있다. 둘째, 자본투자 시장이상현상의 원인을 분석하려는 노력이 계속되어 온 상황에서, 투자비효율성을 완화하는 것으로 확인된 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 자본투자 시장이상현상을 완화하는 요인임을 검증하였다. 즉, 본 논문은 회계정보의 질 및 경쟁강도와 관련하여 자본시장이 더 효율적인 상황을 찾아내고 이를 실증적으로 검증하였으며, 초기 자본시장 연구에서 제시된 것처럼 자본시장의 효율성이 완전하지는 않다는 주장에 대하여 추가적인 증거를 제시하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 셋째, 기업의 내부와 외부에서 정보환경의 역할을 담당하는 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 상호 보완관계를 보임에 따라, 회계정보의 질과 경쟁강도가 모두 낮은 환경에서만 자본투자 시장이상현상이 발견됨을 확인하였다.|This paper examines whether each accounting quality and market competition could mitigate both capital investment inefficiency and capital investment anomaly, and whether the role of accounting quality depends on the industry competition. Firms make a large scale investment which is irrevocable so its impact on firm value is important. But manager's opportunistic behavior or the information asymmetry between manager and investor could cause investment inefficiency. Firms do invest in capital in order to increase firm value but a decline in stock returns is reported after large capital investment. Accounting quality facilitates the board of directors(BOD)' monitoring ability on the manager's investment decision, and competition intensity increases firm's liquidate risk with a low profitability. So both accounting quality and competition intensity could decrease manager's opportunistic behavior and force manager to invest more efficiently. Competition intensity, as a proxy of external information environment, hardly decreases investment inefficiency under the low level of competition industry. Accounting quality could be expected in mitigating investment inefficiency as complimentary in this circumstances. This paper examines whether each accounting quality and competition intensity mitigates investment inefficiency and whether each decreases capital investment anomaly, respectively. If each accounting quality and competition intensity decreases information asymmetry between manager and investor, then it makes the firm's information environments to be transparent. So, it is expected that capital investment anomaly decreases when firms are under the both high level of accounting quality and competitive industry. If firms are under the lower level of competition, then accounting quality could mitigate capital investment anomaly as a complimentary. This paper employs firms listed at Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) from 2000 to 2010. Investment inefficiency is defined as the gap between the expected capital investment and the real investment in this paper. Accounting quality is estimated as the average of four discretionary accruals(DAs) that are mostly used in prior research. HHI(Hirfindahl Hirschman Index) is employed as a proxy of competition intensity. The results are as follows. First, it is documented that each accounting quality and competition intensity mitigates investment inefficiency as expected. Manager of firms in a high level of accounting quality makes capital investment decision more efficiently and BODs monitor manager's decision making effectively. Under the high level of competition industry, high liquidation risks reinforce manager to decide capital investment more efficiently. Second, it is reported that accounting quality mitigates further investment inefficiency only in a low level of competition industry. That is, an accounting quality, as a proxy of internal corporate governance, makes a supplementary role in mitigating firms investment inefficiency when the role of competition, as a proxy of external corporate governance, doesn't work. Third, each accounting quality and competition intensity mitigates the capital investment anomaly. If there are efficient capital investment and transparency improvements caused from either high level of accounting quality or high competition intensity, then the effect of capital investment could be reflected on stock prices in a timely manner. But, there is an additional decline of stock prices after capital investment because the effect of capital investment cannot be reflected sufficiently in stock prices under the low level of accounting quality or low competition. Fourth, accounting quality mitigates capital investment anomaly only when the competition intensity is low. That is, accounting quality and competition intensity have supplementary role in mitigating capital investment anomaly. The followings are the contribution of this study. First, prior research reports only accounting quality can mitigate investment inefficiency. but this paper finds that competition intensity as another factor also mitigates investment inefficiency, and suggests that the role of accounting quality in mitigating investment inefficiency depends on competition intensity. Second, this paper offers accounting quality and competition intensity which could mitigate the investment inefficiency as new factors in mitigating capital investment anomaly. This paper gives additional evidence that capital market could be inefficient when accounting quality and competition intensity is low. Third, accounting quality could mitigate capital investment anomaly only when competition intensity is low.; This paper examines whether each accounting quality and market competition could mitigate both capital investment inefficiency and capital investment anomaly, and whether the role of accounting quality depends on the industry competition. Firms make a large scale investment which is irrevocable so its impact on firm value is important. But manager's opportunistic behavior or the information asymmetry between manager and investor could cause investment inefficiency. Firms do invest in capital in order to increase firm value but a decline in stock returns is reported after large capital investment. Accounting quality facilitates the board of directors(BOD)' monitoring ability on the manager's investment decision, and competition intensity increases firm's liquidate risk with a low profitability. So both accounting quality and competition intensity could decrease manager's opportunistic behavior and force manager to invest more efficiently. Competition intensity, as a proxy of external information environment, hardly decreases investment inefficiency under the low level of competition industry. Accounting quality could be expected in mitigating investment inefficiency as complimentary in this circumstances. This paper examines whether each accounting quality and competition intensity mitigates investment inefficiency and whether each decreases capital investment anomaly, respectively. If each accounting quality and competition intensity decreases information asymmetry between manager and investor, then it makes the firm's information environments to be transparent. So, it is expected that capital investment anomaly decreases when firms are under the both high level of accounting quality and competitive industry. If firms are under the lower level of competition, then accounting quality could mitigate capital investment anomaly as a complimentary. This paper employs firms listed at Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) from 2000 to 2010. Investment inefficiency is defined as the gap between the expected capital investment and the real investment in this paper. Accounting quality is estimated as the average of four discretionary accruals(DAs) that are mostly used in prior research. HHI(Hirfindahl Hirschman Index) is employed as a proxy of competition intensity. The results are as follows. First, it is documented that each accounting quality and competition intensity mitigates investment inefficiency as expected. Manager of firms in a high level of accounting quality makes capital investment decision more efficiently and BODs monitor manager's decision making effectively. Under the high level of competition industry, high liquidation risks reinforce manager to decide capital investment more efficiently. Second, it is reported that accounting quality mitigates further investment inefficiency only in a low level of competition industry. That is, an accounting quality, as a proxy of internal corporate governance, makes a supplementary role in mitigating firms investment inefficiency when the role of competition, as a proxy of external corporate governance, doesn't work. Third, each accounting quality and competition intensity mitigates the capital investment anomaly. If there are efficient capital investment and transparency improvements caused from either high level of accounting quality or high competition intensity, then the effect of capital investment could be reflected on stock prices in a timely manner. But, there is an additional decline of stock prices after capital investment because the effect of capital investment cannot be reflected sufficiently in stock prices under the low level of accounting quality or low competition. Fourth, accounting quality mitigates capital investment anomaly only when the competition intensity is low. That is, accounting quality and competition intensity have supplementary role in mitigating capital investment anomaly. The followings are the contribution of this study. First, prior research reports only accounting quality can mitigate investment inefficiency. but this paper finds that competition intensity as another factor also mitigates investment inefficiency, and suggests that the role of accounting quality in mitigating investment inefficiency depends on competition intensity. Second, this paper offers accounting quality and competition intensity which could mitigate the investment inefficiency as new factors in mitigating capital investment anomaly. This paper gives additional evidence that capital market could be inefficient when accounting quality and competition intensity is low. Third, accounting quality could mitigate capital investment anomaly only when competition intensity is low.