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dc.contributor.author최병덕-
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-13T00:44:42Z-
dc.date.available2022-10-13T00:44:42Z-
dc.date.issued2021-01-
dc.identifier.citation2021 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONICS, INFORMATION, AND COMMUNICATION (ICEIC), page. 1-4en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-7281-9161-4-
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-7281-9162-1-
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9369784/en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/175278-
dc.description.abstractAn unpowered invasive or semi-invasive physical attack on a chip can be a severe threat to the secure data stored in the target chip. This paper presents a secure circuit that can detect unpowered attacks and destroy internal secure data using an on-chip photodiode and charge pump under an unpowered condition. If the chip is under a physical attack including decapsulation, the chip will be exposed to the incident light. The proposed circuit detects the light and converts this light into an electrical signal, which then activates the self-destroying circuit without need for power supply. The self-destroying mechanism uses a gate voltage which is higher than the gate-oxide breakdown voltage that can destroy the transistor of the chip. An on-chip photodiode is used for light sensing. As the harvested voltage from the photodiode is not enough to cause gate-oxide breakdown of the transistor, a charge pump is used to generate the high gate voltage. The charge pump is fabricated using a standard 0.18 mu m complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) process with an area of 0.12 mm(2). The charge pump output increases to 7 V with a supply voltage of 0.7 V.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe EDA tool was supported by the IC Design Education Center.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisher대한전자공학회en_US
dc.subjectsecure circuit; invasive attack; physical attack; decapsulation; unpowered countermeasure; photodiode; charge pump; thin-oxide transistoren_US
dc.titleSecure IC with Countermeasure to Unpowered Physical Attack using On-chip Photodiode and Charge Pumpen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ICEIC51217.2021.9369784en_US
dc.relation.page1-4-
dc.contributor.googleauthorHeo, Hyunwoo-
dc.contributor.googleauthorYou, Donggeun-
dc.contributor.googleauthorKim, Hyungseup-
dc.contributor.googleauthorKwon, Yongsu-
dc.contributor.googleauthorKo, Hyoungho-
dc.contributor.googleauthorKim, Dong Kyue-
dc.contributor.googleauthorChoi, Byong-Deok-
dc.contributor.googleauthorKim, Ji-Hoon-
dc.sector.campusS-
dc.sector.daehakCOLLEGE OF ENGINEERING[S]-
dc.sector.departmentSCHOOL OF ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING-
dc.identifier.pidbdchoi-
dc.identifier.researcherIDAAA-6183-2022-
Appears in Collections:
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING[S](공과대학) > ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING(융합전자공학부) > Articles
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