258 163

Corporate Governance and the Marginal Cash Value for Korean Retail Firms

Title
Corporate Governance and the Marginal Cash Value for Korean Retail Firms
Author
이정환
Keywords
Cash Management; Corporate Governance; Manager-Shareholder Conflicts; Marginal Value of Cash
Issue Date
2016-05
Publisher
한국유통과학회
Citation
유통과학연구, v. 14, NO. 5, Page. 27-37
Abstract
Purpose – Prior theories expect a lower marginal value of cash for weak governance firms. To test this hypothesis, we examine the relationship between corporate governance structures and marginal cash values in Korean retail firms. Research design, data, and methodology – We estimate marginal cash values based on the model of Faulkender & Wang (2006). The retail firms listed in Korean Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013 are analyzed. Corporate governance scores are provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. Results – We show a higher marginal value of cash for the weak governance retail firms in terms of total governance score. Our analysis on a detailed set of governance scores generally confirms this tendency. Yet, a higher marginal cash value is obtained for the firms with better board structures and dividend policies. Conclusions – Our findings argue against the agency view of cash policy predicting a negative relationship between corporate governance scores and marginal cash values. A low marginal value of cash, widely observed in the sample firms, also supports severe resource diversion problem in Korean corporations.
URI
http://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART002110622http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11754/56452
ISSN
1738-3110; 2093-7717
DOI
10.15722/jds.14.5.201605.27
Appears in Collections:
COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE[S](경제금융대학) > ECONOMICS & FINANCE(경제금융학부) > Articles
Files in This Item:
Corporate Governance and the Marginal Cash Value for Korean Retail Firms.pdfDownload
Export
RIS (EndNote)
XLS (Excel)
XML


qrcode

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

BROWSE