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dc.contributor.author고영우-
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-13T02:16:05Z-
dc.date.available2018-03-13T02:16:05Z-
dc.date.issued2013-12-
dc.identifier.citationReview of Economic Design, Vol.17, No.4 [2013], p307-327en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742-
dc.identifier.urihttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10058-013-0147-9-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11754/45765-
dc.description.abstractWe study a keyword auction model where bidders have constrained budgets. In the absence of budget constraints, Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) analyze "locally envy-free equilibrium" or "symmetric Nash equilibrium" bidding strategies in generalized second-price auctions. However, bidders often have to set their daily budgets when they participate in an auction; once a bidder's payment reaches his budget, he drops out of the auction. This raises an important strategic issue that has been overlooked in the previous literature: bidders may change their bids to inflict higher prices on their competitors because under generalized second-price, the per-click price paid by a bidder is the next highest bid. We provide budget thresholds under which equilibria analyzed in Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) are sustained as "equilibria with budget constraints" in our setting. We then consider a simple environment with one position and two bidders and show that a search engine's revenue with budget constraints may be larger than its revenue without budget constraints.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Science + Business Mediaen_US
dc.subjectAuctionen_US
dc.subjectBiden_US
dc.subjectBiddingen_US
dc.subjectEquilibriaen_US
dc.subjectEquilibriumen_US
dc.titleKeyword auctions with budget-constrained biddersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.relation.no4-
dc.relation.volume17-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-013-0147-9-
dc.relation.page307-321-
dc.relation.journalREVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN-
dc.contributor.googleauthorKoh, Y.-
dc.relation.code2013014976-
dc.sector.campusS-
dc.sector.daehakCOLLEGE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE[S]-
dc.sector.departmentDIVISION OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE-
dc.identifier.pidywkoh-
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COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE[S](경제금융대학) > ECONOMICS & FINANCE(경제금융학부) > Articles
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