외환위기 전후의 부채조달의사결정에 재무유연성과 세금효과가 미치는 영향

Abstract

부채의 세금효과가 존재함에도 부채를 적게 사용하는 보수적 부채조달현상이 보고된이래로 부채사용에 따른 혜택과 더불어 비용 측면에서 부채를 설명하기 위한 노력이 진행되어 왔다. DeAngelo and DeAngelo(2007)는 부채조달의사결정에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 원인으로 재무유연성을 언급하고 있다. 재무유연성이란 자금수요 발생 시 낮은 자금조달비용으로 적시에 반응할 수 있는 능력을 의미한다(Byoun 2011; Denis 2011). 재무유연성이 낮을수록 투자기회에 적절한 대응을 할 수 없으므로 과소투자에 따른 손실이 커질 수있다. 따라서 재무유연성이 낮은 경우 세금효과가 존재함에도 부채조달능력을 유지하기 위하여 보수적으로 부채를 조달할 수 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 Killi et. al.(2011)는 재무유연성이 부채조달의 기회비용이라고 언급하고 있다. 우리나라에서도 외환위기 이후 보수적부채조달현상이 보고되고 있지만 부채를 비용 측면에서 설명하려는 다양한 시도가 이루어지지 않고 있다. 본 연구는 외환위기를 중심으로 부채와 한계세율 및 재무유연성의 의미를 검증하고자 한다. 본 연구의 목적은 외환위기를 중심으로 부채를 결정하는 중요한 요인으로 재무유연성과 세금유인의 의미를 검증하는 것이다. 그리고 외환위기 전후 부채조달의사결정에 대한 재무유연성과 세금유인의 상대적 중요성에 대한 실증적 증거를 제시하는 것이다. 실증결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째 외환위기 이전 재무유연성과 부채간의 관련성은 나타나지 않지만 외환위기 이후 재무유연성과 부채간의 양(+)의 관련성이 관찰되었다. 이는 외환위기 이후 재무유연성을 고려하여 부채조달의사결정을 수행한다는 것을 의미하고, 부채조달능력을 유지하려는 유인이 외환위기 이후 강화됨을 나타낸다. 둘째 외환위기 이후 부채와 한계세율간의 관련성이 감소되는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 외환위기 이후 부채를 이용한 절세유인이 감소됨을 의미하며, 외환위기 이후 부채조달능력을 유지하려는 유인이 낮은 경우에 한하여 세금효과를 고려하여 부채조달의사결정을 하고 있다는 것을 의미한다. 그리고 재무유연성은 외환위기 이후 보고되고 있는 보수적 부채조달현상의 원인이 될 수 있음을 의미한다. 본 연구의 공헌점은 외환위기라는 경제적 사건을 중심으로 부채의 결정요인으로 재무유연성에 대한 의미를 검증한 것이다. 그리고 재무유연성은 외환위기 이후 보고된 보수적 부채조달현상의 원인이 될 수 있다는 점을 제시한 것이다. Study on the determinants of capital structure is an important topic in modern Finance. Modigliani and Miller(1958) demonstrate that given investment policy and with no taxes or contracting costs, the choice of financing policy does not affect the current market value of the firm. However, Modigliani and Miller(1963) argue that corporate tax allows the deduction of interest payments in calculating taxable income. Thus they contend that firms prefer to use more debt, in extreme case, capital structure may consist of 99.9% debt. In contrast, Miller(1977) shows that the corporate tax advantage of debt is offset by personal income tax, therefore, the tax advantage of debt is not that significant. Based on Modigliani and Miller(1963), Myers and Majiluf(1984) and other researchers explain the corporate financing decisions by analyzing costs and benefits of debt use. Here, the benefit of debt use is tax advantage and the costs of debt are financial distress, bankruptcy costs, personal income tax, and agency costs (Scott 1976; Miller 1977; Myers 1977). Molina(2005) and Ko and Yoon(2011) explain corporate financing policy by analyzing the relations between tax advantage and bankruptcy. van Binsbergen et al.(2010) explains the financing policy by estimating marginal cost function and examining the relations between tax advantage and tax costs. DeAngelo and DeAngelo(2007), one of the research explaining financing policy with respect to the cost of debt, presents the concept of financial flexibility. Financial flexibility refers to as the degree of capacity and speed at which the firm can mobilize its financial resources in order to take reactive, preventive, and exploitive actions to maximize the firm value (Byoun 2011; Denis 2011). According to the trade-off theory, based on the traditional costs and benefits, since debt financing of current year increases cost of debt and decreases debt capacity in the future. In particular, the lower the financial flexibility, additional debt financing tends to decrease debt capacity. Thus the financial flexibility refers to opportunity costs (Killi et al. 2011). In connection with aforementioned studies, DeAngelo and DeAngelo(2007) argues that firms may use relatively small amount of debt in order to maintain debt capacity, even corporate tax advantage of debt exists. Ahn et al.(2011) surveyed chief financial officers of Korean companies and found that eighty percent of financial managers consider the cost and benefit of debt when they make decisions on financing policy. It is suggesting that debt capacity of a firm is limited to a certain boundary and implying that debt use of current year affects debt capacity in the future. In addition, in the late 1990s, numerous Korean companies went bankrupt due to the lack of liquidity, although they possessed enough assets. Therefore companies began to make buffers responding to the uncertain capital requirements (Lee 2010). Taken together, we predict incentives for maintaining debt capacity affect financing policy after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. We also predict the importance of financial flexibility, as a determinant of financing policy, is greater in the post-financial crisis period than in the pre-financial crisis period. Ko and Kim(2012) argues that marginal tax rate does not explain the debt financing policy in the post-financial crisis period. Suggesting that, when a firm makes a decision on financing policy, cost of debt is more significant factor than tax advantage. Thus, in the post-financial crisis period, we predict, in order to maintaindebt capacity, although tax advantage exists, firms experiencing low financial flexibility have propensity to use debt conservatively. Additionally,explanatory power of financial flexibility towards the financing policy will be greater than that of tax effect. The purposes of our paper are as follows. Firstly, we document financial flexibility is a significant determinant of debt financing policy. Also, we test whether the relevance of financial flexibility to financing policy differs between pre- and post-financial crisis period. Secondly, we test whether there are differences between pre- and post- financial crisis period, with respect to the relevance of tax advantage to financing policy. Thirdly, we report the interactions between the financial flexibility and tax effect in financing policy. The results are as follows. First of all, we find no significant relations between financial flexibility and debt in the pre-financial crisis period, however, we find positive relations in the post-financial crisis period. Also, we find no significant relations between marginal tax rate and debt in the post-financial crisis period while we find positive relations in the pre-financial crisis period. It is suggesting that, in the pre-financial crisis period, tax effect plays more significant role in debt financing, however, financial flexibility is more important determinant of debt financing in the post-financial crisis period. It also implies that tax effect could be constrained by financial flexibility in the post-financial crisis period. Furthermore, we are suggesting that tax advantage of debt may affect debt financing decision when the incentives for maintaining debt capacity is low. Our study contributes to the literature by documenting the significance of financial flexibility in debt financing policy. Moreover, we show that financial flexibility has explanatory power for the debt financing policy in the post-financial crisis period, rather than tax effects. Likewise, in the post-financial crisis period, we suggest that tax advantage of debt explains debt financing policy only when firms have incentives for maintaining debt capacity. Finally, we suggest that one of the culprits in the decreasing relations between tax effects and financing policy in the post-financial crisis period.