Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure
- Title
- Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure
- Author
- 윤성호
- Keywords
- Choice of technology; Outsourcing; Two-sided asymmetric information; PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP; INFORMED PRINCIPAL; INCENTIVES; VALUES
- Issue Date
- 2004-06
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
- Citation
- INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, v. 16, No. 2, Page. 165-178
- Abstract
- We study a monopsonist-supplier model in which each party has its own technology for production. The supplier may use its own or be required to adopt the buyer's technology. Because the efficiency of each technology is unknown to the other party, the choice of technology determines the informed party. We find that using the buyer's technology reduces not only the supplier's incentive to misrepresent, but sometimes the buyer's as well. As a result, when equally efficient, the buyer's technology is adopted. In cases where each technology has several states of efficiency, the less efficient technology may be assigned in the optimal contract.
- URI
- https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624503000398#!https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/149418
- ISSN
- 0167-6245
- DOI
- j.infoecopol.2003.06.001
- Appears in Collections:
- COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS[E](경상대학) > ECONOMICS(경제학부) > Articles
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