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한국전쟁 휴전회담 연구

Title
한국전쟁 휴전회담 연구
Other Titles
Studies on the Armistice Talks during the Korean War
Author
김보영
Alternative Author(s)
Kim, Bo Young
Advisor(s)
이완재, 박찬승
Issue Date
2008-02
Publisher
한양대학교
Degree
Doctor
Abstract
1950년 6월 25일 전쟁 발발 후 1년만인 1951년 6월 양측은 휴전을 모색하고, 협상을 시작하였다. 그 후 2년여 동안 일면 협상, 일면 전투의 소모전이 계속되었고, 1953년 7월 27일 휴전협정이 체결되면서 전쟁은 중단되었다. 회담이 결렬과 재개를 반복하는 동안 전투는 계속되었고, 지난한 협상의 과정에서 정전체제의 기본 틀이 형성되었다. 휴전회담은 전쟁의 마무리이자 전후체제를 만드는 과정이었다. 회담은 전투와 긴밀히 결합하여 진행되었고, 협상장이었던 판문점에서만이 아니라 유엔과 국제외교무대에서도 이루어졌다. 이는 단순히 전투를 끝내기 위한 것이 아니라 전쟁의 명분과 심리적 승리를 위한 또 하나의 전쟁이었다. 휴전회담의 의제는 군사적 정전 및 그 결과로서의 휴전과, 이 휴전이 적대행위의 재발을 방지하는 보장 조건하에서 이루어져야 한다는 것이 기본 전제였다. 회담의 결과로 만들어진 정전협정에서 핵심조항은, 군사분계선과 비무장지대 설정, 군사력 증강 금지와 중립국감시기구 구성, 정치회담을 통한 한반도 문제의 평화적 해결 등이며, 포로송환 협상은 전쟁의 마무리 과정이었다. 한국전쟁은 휴전회담이 시작된 이래 협상의 추이에 따라 휴전이 성사되거나 전쟁이 장기화하거나 하는 기로에 있었다. 따라서 휴전회담의 진행과정에 따라 한국전쟁의 양상은 상당히 달라질 수 있었다. 그러나 휴전회담의 전 과정은 군사작전과 긴밀히 결합되어 전개되었다. 전쟁을 마무리하기 위해 협상을 시작하였지만, 그 협상을 유리하게 이끌기 위해 전투를 계속하였던 것은 일견 모순이었다. 양측은 휴전회담 초기 군사분계선 협상 과정에서 ‘휴전협정 체결 시까지 전투를 계속한다’는 원칙에 합의하였다. 군사분계선 협상이 마무리된 1951년 11월 말 시점에 사실상 전투를 중단할 수 있었지만, 미국은 전투를 계속하기를 원했고, 중국도 여기에 합의했다. 그것이 소모전이 지속된 이유이다. 또 협상을 진행해가는 과정에서 양측은 협상을 유리하게 하기 위해서는 군사적 압력이 효과적이라는 인식을 가졌으며, 이것이 대규모 폭격과 전선에서의 고지쟁탈전이 끊임없이 이어지는 계기가 되었다. 회담을 시작한 이래 양측의 전쟁수행방침은 회담과 연동되어 변화하였고, 회담은 전쟁의 주체들의 행위를 결정짓는 주요축이었다. 회담장이 또 하나의 전장이 된 것은 그것이 승리를 대신할 명분 싸움이 되었기 때문이라고 보는 것이 일반적인 견해였다. 그렇지만 회담의 과정은 전후를 준비하는 과정이기도 했기 때문에 단순한 명분 싸움은 아니었고, 실질적인 타협을 필요로 했다. 양측이 회담 초기 의제 선정을 둘러싸고 벌인 논쟁은 그것이 갖는 의미 때문이었다. 즉 전후체제 구상에서의 대립이었던 셈이다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 때 포로문제는 일회적이며 부차적인 문제였다. 전쟁이 끝나고 포로는 본국으로 송환하면 되는 것이었을 뿐, 정전체제의 구조와는 상관이 없는 것이었다. 그러한 포로문제를 쟁점화하고 심리전으로 전화시킨 것은 미국이었다. 단순해보였던 포로문제를 휴전협상의 ‘뜨거운 감자’로 만든 것은 유엔군 측이 제기한 자원송환원칙 때문이었다. 포로에게 선택의 기회를 허용해야 한다는 이러한 발상은 심리전을 고려하여 제기된 것이었고, 이를 계기로 전쟁은 심리전이자 이념전으로 전화하였다. 휴전회담의 전 과정을 볼 때, 협상이 지연된 요인은 복합적이었다. 회담과정에서 중요한 기로에 섰던 때가 두 번 있었다. 첫 번째는 1951년 11월 27일 군사분계선 협상이 타결된 시점이었다. 이때 한 달 내로 다른 의제 합의가 이루어지면 휴전협상은 끝나는 것이었다. 양측은 다른 의제 합의가 쉽게 될 것이라고 예측했다. 그러나 제3의제의 비행장문제와 소련 중립국안이 쟁점이 되며, 한 달 기한이 넘어버렸고, 포로문제 역시 간단하지는 않았다. 결론적으로 볼 때 유엔군 측이 비행장 문제를 제기한 것은 형평성에도 어긋나며, 공산군 측이 받아들일 수 있는 사안도 아니었다. 공산 측이 소련을 중립국으로 선정하는 제안을 내놓은 것도 역시 그것이 받아들여질 것을 기대했다기 보다는 협상의 도구로 활용한 측면이 강했다. 두 번째 협상 타결의 가능성이 높았던 시점은, 1952년 7월 13일 유엔군 측이 830,000명의 송환포로 총수를 제시했을 때였다. 공산 측이 이 제안을 수용했다면, 전쟁은 1년 이상 빨리 끝날 수 있었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 이때 중국은 북한과 소련의 동의를 얻어 강경책을 선택하였다. 결국 1년 후 공산 측이 자원송환원칙을 수용하고 송환포로의 총수도 거의 변동이 없었다는 점에서, 이러한 선택은 협상의 쟁점이었던 자원송환원칙이 문제가 아니었다고 볼 수 있다. 강경책을 선택한 주요인은, 중국군의 전력이 강화되어 1년 이상 충분히 버틸 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 주도적으로 공세작전을 펼칠 수 있다는 자신감에서 비롯되었다. 폭격으로 인해 인적 물적 피해가 막대했던 북한은 회담이 시작되는 시점부터 조기 휴전을 요구했지만, 회담과 전쟁을 주도하였던 마오쩌뚱과 스탈린은 이러한 북한의 요구를 묵살하였다. 결국 전쟁을 끝내기 위해 회담을 시작했지만, 그 회담의 쟁점을 빌미로 전쟁을 장기화한 것은 미국과 중국의 선택이었다. 한국전쟁은 남북한 및 중·소, 유엔군 등이 참전한 국제전이었다. 내전에서 출발하여 국제전으로 변모하였고, 체제 간 대립이자 이념전이었던 한국전쟁에서 남북한은 조연으로 전락하였다. 한·미관계와 북·중관계, 전쟁의 주도권, 휴전협상의 주체, 협정체결의 주체 등의 문제를 고려해 볼 때, 남한은 주체가 아니었으며, 북한 역시 공산 3국의 역관계 속에서 상당한 제약을 받았다. 전쟁의 주체가 곧 휴전협상의 주체가 될 것인데, 남한은 전쟁을 치른 당사자였지만 협상의 주체가 되지 못했고, 협정 체결에서도 빠져 버렸다. 이것은 단순히 작전지휘권을 미군에 이양하였기 때문이 아니라, 미국의 전쟁수행방식과 남한에 대한 인식과 태도가 더 중요한 요인이었다. 미국은 전쟁과 휴전회담에서 독점적 결정권을 갖고자 했다. 정전체제 이행의 주체이면서도 정전체제의 근본적인 변화, 즉 평화체제로의 전환문제에서 여전히 남한의 역할은 제한적이다. 남한은 휴전협정 조인 당사자가 아니며, 협정 체결 시까지도 휴전 자체를 반대하는 입장이었다. 이러한 한국의 입장은 이후 정전체제의 불안정성으로 이어진다.
In June 1951, one year after the breakout of the Korean War on June 25th in 1950, both sides sought for an armistice, and commenced negotiations. For the next two years, negotiations continued while battles were still being fought(it was indeed a war of attrition), and the war finally ended with the signing of the armistice on July 27th, 1953. Talks for the armistice continued to break down and then reopen again, and throughout that lengthy and messy process, the basic format for the cease-fire status(that would follow the end of the war) was established. The armistice talks was a step that would book-end the war, and it was also an opportunity to design the new status-quo status which would come to reality after the end of the war. Every facet of the negotiations were closely related to the ongoing status of the war, and talks were arranged not only at the Panmun-jeom facility(the officially designated place for the talks) but also at U.N. and other foreign places. Those talks themselves were not mere negotiations to end the war, but rather another form of warfare waged by opponents which were determined to secure victory for themselves in psychological terms and philosophical causes. The agendas that were discussed at the armistice talks directly dealt with issues like the very cease-fire in military terms, an armistice as a result of that. And the talks had the most basic premise that such cease-fire and armistice should be established under the assurance that hostile exchanges would never reoccur. The finally established Cease-fire treaty, which was the result of the negotiations, referred to many issues, such as the establishment of a military demarcation line and a de-militarized zone, firm banning on military reinforcements and buildups, the organization of a neutral monitoring body, and devising a peaceful resolution for the Korean peninsula situation through political discussions. Negotiations to discuss the return of the prisoners was the last step to end the war. Since the negotiations had begun, the path that the negotiations would take would determine whether the Korean war would continue or end with an armistice. Naturally, the continuing talks could have heavily affected the ongoing war, and driven it into an entirely new direction. But the entire process of talks were closely related to the military operations. Negotiations began to end the war, but quite ironically, in order to ensure a more favorable position in talks, both sides just kept fighting. In the early days of the negotiations for establishing the military demarcation line, both sides agreed that battles would continue until an armistice is signed. Yet when negotiations for the military demarcation lines were finally closed in November 1951, although they could have halted their battles, U.S. wanted the war to continue, and China also concurred. That was why this attritive war continued even after that. Both sides were confident that military pressures would be most effective in ensuring a higher position for themselves in talks, so large-scale bombings and struggles for high areas in the front-lines continued. Since the beginning of the negotiations, the objectives and directives for the battle plans changed according to the situation of the talks. Those talks literally defined and determined the actions of both sides. The negotiation table itself became another battle field which would ensure the victor of a victory in high causes. Yet the negotiations were also part of the task of preparing for the post-war period, so added to the conflicts over causes, practical compromises and resolutions were called for as well. Both sides, in the early days, quarreled with each other over the issue of choosing agendas to be discussed. In essence, they were conflicting each other with their respective plans for the post-war period. In that regard, the issue of prisoners return was only a one-event issue, and a secondary problem. After the war, the prisoners would simply be returned to their home, and the issue itself was deemed to have nothing to do with the cease-fire issue. But U.S. elevated that issue, and started to wage a psychological war with that issue. U.N. proposed a principle of the so-called 'voluntary returning', and this proposition ended up hopelessly complicating the issue. It literally made the issue a 'hot potato' at the negotiation table. This kind of proposition, which stated that the prisoners should be granted the right to choose where they would wish to go, was devised with considerations over the effects that could only be generated by psychological operations. With this proposition, another layer was added to the war, and the war was transformed into a warfare of ideology. Considering the entire process of the armistice talks, there were multiple reasons that caused the talks to literally drag. There were two most crucial times for the fate of the talks, which could have ended the war a lot sooner. The first time was when the negotiations for the military demarcation line were ended and an agreement was established on November 27th, 1951. At the time, the completion of the entire talks was indeed expected, if agreements for other agendas were to be reached in a one-month window. Both sides expected no difficulties in reaching those agreements. Yet the issue of airbases referred to in the 3rd agenda and the U.S.S.R. Neutral state plan became hotly debated issues, and caused the talks to continue, and to cross the one-month deadline. And the war prisoner issue became complicated as much as it could get. It was not fair in the first place that U.N. would raise the airbase issue, and it was certainly not an issue that the Communist military could embrace or accept. Instead, they proposed the plan to recognize U.S.S.R as a neutral party, and it too was not a proposal that could be approached fondly by the other side. Both plans were mere bargaining chips. The second time when the possibility of reaching an agreement was higher than ever was July 13th 1952, when U.N. suggested the number of war prisoners to be returned(830,000). If the Communist side accepted this proposal, the war might have ended a year earlier than it actually did. Yet China chose to do it the hard way, with the consent of North Korea and U.S.S.R.. If we take into account the fact that after one year the Communist side decided to accept the 'voluntary return' principle and there was no visible difference between the number of people who actually returned and the number suggested by U.N., we can see that the 'voluntary return' principle was not a decisive variable that caused the war to drag at all. China decided to continue the war because the power of the Chinese army was significantly strengthened and they projected that they would be able to continue the war over more than a year, and also because they were sure that they could continue staging offensives against the enemy. North Korea was suffering heavy, incalculable damages in terms of both men and equipment because of the bombings, so it required an early establishment of an armistice since the beginning of the negotiations, yet Mao Zodung and Stalin, who both led the negotiations and the war, ignored North Korea's requests. Negotiations actually began in efforts and determinations to end the war, but it was the choice of U.S. and China which turned it into a very lengthy and messy business, merely over the agendas of the negotiations. The Korean war was an international war which was joined by not only the South and North Korean forces, but also Chinese and Russian, and U.N. forces. It began as a civil war, and later was transformed into an international war. It was a conflict between two systems, and a conflict of ideology. In the Korean war, the South and North Koreas were only supporting actors. In many issues such as the South Korea-U.S. relationship, North Korea-China relationship, or seizing the initiatives in the war and conducting negotiations and signing the treaties, South Korea was never a leading actor, and North Korea as well was equipped with very few options considering their relationship with other Communist countries. (South) Korea was the opponent who actually fought the war, but it never was allowed to assume the role of an opponent at the negotiation table, and was also excluded from the signing of the treaty. It was not because it transferred its military command authorities to U.S., but more because of U.S.' way of fighting a war, and its view of and attitude toward South Korea. U.S. intended to have an exclusively decisive power regarding the war, and also at the negotiations table. South Korea was to only serve a very limited role, which was to maintain the cease-fire status, but it was never fully capable of leading prominent and substantial changes, such as converting the cease-fire status into a status of peaceful coexistence. South Korea was not one of the parties which signed the armistice treaty, and had actually been against the idea of armistice itself up until the signing of the treaty. This position of South Korea later led to the instability of the cease-fire status.
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https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/147459http://hanyang.dcollection.net/common/orgView/200000409276
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GRADUATE SCHOOL[S](대학원) > HISTORY(사학과) > Theses (Ph.D.)
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