기업지배구조가 원가의 하방경직성(비대칭성)에 미치는 영향

Abstract

본 연구는 기업지배구조가 원가의 비대칭성에 미치는 영향에 대해서 알아보고, KOSPI200 지수를 기준으로 집단간 차이를 분석하였으며 모니터링 유인이 있는 기관투자자가 원가의 비대칭성에 미치는 영향에 대해서 분석하였다. 연구에 사용된 변수로는 판매관리비, 인건비, 광고선전비를 종속변수로 사용하였으며, 기업지배구조의 변수로는 이사회 내 사외이사 비율, 사외이사 지분율, 감사위원회 설치여부, 감사위원회 내 사외이사 비율, 보상위원회 설치 여부, 보상위원회 내 사외이사 비율을 사용하였다. 기업지배구조 변수들은 금융감독원 전자공시시스템(DART)를 통하여 2005년부터 2010년까지 유가증권 상장 기업들을 대상으로 수집하였으며 총 3,040개의 기업-연도 데이터를 가지고 분석을 시행하였다. 분석결과 첫째, 판매관리비의 원가의 비대칭성은 이사회 내 사외이사 비율이 높을수록, 사외이사의 지분율이 높을수록 완화되었다. 인건비의 원가의 비대칭성은 이사회 내 사외이사 비율이 높을수록, 사외이사 지분율이 높을수록 완화되었으며, 감사위원회와 보상위원회가 설치되어 있으면 원가의 비대칭성을 완화시키는 것으로 나타났다. 광고선전비의 원가의 비대칭성은 이사회 내 사외이사 비율이 높을수록 완화되며, 감사위원회와 보상위원회가 설치되어 있으면 원가의 비대칭성을 완화시키는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, KOSPI200지수와 관련해서는 KOSPI200지수에 속한 기업일수록 원가의 비대칭성이 완화되는 것으로 드러났다. 셋째, 모니터링 유인이 있는 기관투자자는 원가의 비대칭성을 완화시키는 것으로 드러났다. |This study examined the effect of corporate governance on the cost stickiness. And as grouping the data by KOSPI200 index, this study examined the difference between group of KOSPI200 index and group of non KOSPI200 index. And this study examined the effect of institutional ownership who have monitor incentives on the cost stickiness. This study use the dependent variables that Selling, General, and Administrative Costs(SGA) and Salaries/Wages Expenses(SWE) and Advertising, Campaign Costs. This study use the independent variables that ratio of outside directors in board of directors(BOD), and ownership of outside directors in board of directors(BOD), and the things whether the audit committee is being or not, and the ratio of outside directors in audit committee, and the things whether the compensation committee is being or not, and the ratio of outside directors in compensation committee. The variables of corporate governance were collected through the website, DART. And this data is composed of the 3,040 firms that have been in securities market from 2005 to 2010. The finding suggests that First, SGA costs are less asymmetric for firms which have higher ratio of outside directors and ownership of outside directors in BOD. SWE are less asymmetric for firms that have higher ratio of outside directors and ownership of outside directors in BOD, and audit committee & compensation committee. Advertising, Campaign Costs are less asymmetric for firms that have higher ratio of outside directors in BOD, and audit committee & compensation committee. Second, the firms which belong to the KOSPI200 index show less asymmetric. Finally we find that institutional ownership who have monitor incentives decrease the degree of cost asymmetry; This study examined the effect of corporate governance on the cost stickiness. And as grouping the data by KOSPI200 index, this study examined the difference between group of KOSPI200 index and group of non KOSPI200 index. And this study examined the effect of institutional ownership who have monitor incentives on the cost stickiness. This study use the dependent variables that Selling, General, and Administrative Costs(SGA) and Salaries/Wages Expenses(SWE) and Advertising, Campaign Costs. This study use the independent variables that ratio of outside directors in board of directors(BOD), and ownership of outside directors in board of directors(BOD), and the things whether the audit committee is being or not, and the ratio of outside directors in audit committee, and the things whether the compensation committee is being or not, and the ratio of outside directors in compensation committee. The variables of corporate governance were collected through the website, DART. And this data is composed of the 3,040 firms that have been in securities market from 2005 to 2010. The finding suggests that First, SGA costs are less asymmetric for firms which have higher ratio of outside directors and ownership of outside directors in BOD. SWE are less asymmetric for firms that have higher ratio of outside directors and ownership of outside directors in BOD, and audit committee & compensation committee. Advertising, Campaign Costs are less asymmetric for firms that have higher ratio of outside directors in BOD, and audit committee & compensation committee. Second, the firms which belong to the KOSPI200 index show less asymmetric. Finally we find that institutional ownership who have monitor incentives decrease the degree of cost asymmetry