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SEARCH, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND MARKET CLEARING

Title
SEARCH, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND MARKET CLEARING
Author
조인구
Keywords
COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; UNEMPLOYMENT; UNCERTAINTY; LEMONS
Issue Date
2018-08
Publisher
WILEY
Citation
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, v. 59, no. 3, page. 1437-1467
Abstract
We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long-term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents' patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold.
URI
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/iere.12309https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/119763
ISSN
0020-6598; 1468-2354
DOI
10.1111/iere.12309
Appears in Collections:
COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE[S](경제금융대학) > ECONOMICS & FINANCE(경제금융학부) > Articles
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