Russia's Arms Sales Policy after the Ukrainian Sanctions

Abstract

Russia sells arms primarily to enhance its influence abroad in key regions, e.g., the Middle East, East, and South Asia. Since the government is the primary customer for this sector’s goods, this sector does not risk collapse even if arms sales decline though arms sales bring vital foreign currency. But, the intervening motive between seeking enhanced global influence and maintaining the defense sector is the acquisition of elite rents since the arms trade offers multiple opportunities for corruption. We then focus on the impact of arms production and sales on international security. First that means looking at how Russia’s militarization and its increasing conversion into a mobilization state is affected by the ever growing importance of defense investment and production to the government and the economy. We then investigate the impact of arms sales on international security in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia. 俄罗斯销售武器主要是为了提高其在关键地区的影响力，例如中东、东亚和南亚。鉴于政府是国防部门武器的主要购买者，即使军售下降，该部门也不存在崩溃的风险，尽管军售带来重要外币收入。寻求提高全球影响力和维持国防部门，二者间的动机是为了从精英阶层处获取租金，因为武器贸易为腐败提供了多重机遇。作者随后聚焦于武器生产销售对国际安全造成的影响。第一，这意味着审视，俄罗斯的军事化进程和该进程日渐转变为一种军事动员一事，是如何被对政府和经济而言重要性不断增加的国防投资和生产所影响的。作者之后研究了军售对拉美、中东、东亚地区的国际安全造成的影响。