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Decentralized College Admissions

Title
Decentralized College Admissions
Author
고영우
Keywords
INCENTIVES; STABILITY; MARKET; CURSE
Issue Date
2016-10
Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
Citation
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, v. 124, NO. 5, Page. 1295-1338
Abstract
We study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences. Colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below. When students' attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weight on school-specific attributes such as essays. Restricting the number of applications or wait-listing alleviates enrollment uncertainty, but the outcomes are inefficient and unfair. A centralized matching via Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm attains efficiency and fairness but may make some colleges worse off than under decentralized matching.
URI
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/688082https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/100588
ISSN
0022-3808; 1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/688082
Appears in Collections:
COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE[S](경제금융대학) > ECONOMICS & FINANCE(경제금융학부) > Articles
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