Parallel Imports, their Deterrence and Accommodation with Service Differentiation
- Title
- Parallel Imports, their Deterrence and Accommodation with Service Differentiation
- Author
- 윤성호
- Keywords
- Parallel imports; price discrimination; service differentiation
- Issue Date
- 2017-06
- Publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- Citation
- International Trade Journal, v. 31, No. 3, Page. 217-231
- Abstract
- In the traditional economics models, parallel imports prevent a manufacturer from price discrimination involving the same good between countries. As a result, the manufacturer loses profit and tries to discourage parallel imports. The consumers in low-price countries also lose when parallel imports are legalized because the price in such countries increases. When value-added services such as a warranty and technical support are available only for the authorized product (i.e., when services are differentiated), however, the manufacturer may obtain a larger profit with parallel imports, as shown in literature. We extend this study by analyzing the case in which the manufacturer can choose the level of value-added services. It turns out that the manufacturer may even encourage parallel imports when the cost for value-added services is not too low or too high. We also show that the consumers in low-price countries may gain when parallel imports are legalized.
- URI
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08853908.2016.1269700https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/handle/20.500.11754/72183
- ISSN
- 0885-3908
- DOI
- 10.1080/08853908.2016.1269700
- Appears in Collections:
- COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS[E](경상대학) > ECONOMICS(경제학부) > Articles
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