적극적 재무보고와 적극적 세무보고간의 관계 분석

Abstract

재무보고 및 세무보고와 관련된 선행연구들은 세금비용과 비세금비용의 상충관계를 주로 다루었다. 그러나 회계원칙과 세법규정이 일치하지 않는 항목들을 이용한 재무보고이익의 증가와, 세금탈세와 조세회피수단의 남용이 함께 증가했다는 것은 모든 기업들이 재무보고와 세무보고 의사결정에 있어 세금비용과 비세금비용의 상충관계에 직면하지는 않는다는 것을 의미한다. Frank et al.(2009)은 발생액 이익조정을 하는 적극적 재무보고기업이 동시에 조세회피수단을 활용한 적극적 세무보고도 수행한다는 결과를 제시하였다. 그러나 국내기업에서 재무보고이익을 증가하는 적극적 재무보고 기업이 동시에 세부담을 감소하는 적극적 세무보고도 가능한지 여부는 재무보고이익 증가에 대응하여 사용가능한 조세회피수단의 존재여부에 달려있는 것으로 보인다. 본 연구는 국내기업에서도 이익조정을 하는 적극적 재무보고기업이 동시에 세금비용을 감소시키는 적극적 세무보고전략을 수행하는지를 분석함으로써 적극적 재무보고와 적극적 세무보고간의 관계를 재검토하였다. 연구기간은 2000년부터 2009년까지 10년간이며 연구표본은 총 3,626개이다. 적극적 재무보고의 측정치로 성과조정재량발생액(PMDAC)을 사용하고, 적극적 세무보고의 측정치로 산업-규모조정 유효세율(GETR)을 사용하여 OLS 및 2SLS 분석으로 가설을 검증한 결과는 PMDAC와 GETR간에는 유의적인 음의 관계가 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 이 결과는 Frank et al.(2009)과는 상반되는 것으로 국내기업의 경우 적극적 세무보고 기업은 재량적 발생액의 증가를 통한 적극적 재무보고를 수행하지 못하고, 재량적 발생액을 통해 적극적 재무보고를 수행하는 기업은 세무보고에서 세금부담을 감소시키는 적극적 세무보고를 수행하지 못한다는 것을 나타내는 것이다. 수익률 분석의 결과는 투자자들이 적극적 재무보고에 과대반응하는 것으로 나타나 발생액 이상현상을 보고한 선행연구와 일치하는 결과를 보였다. 그러나 선행연구와 달리 가장 적극적 재무보고 집단에서 적극적 세무보고에 따른 초과수익률이 나타난다는 증거는 발견하지 못하였다.Prior accounting research typically investigates the tradeoffs between financial and tax reporting in settings where financial accounting and tax rules conform. But, consistent with the growing book-tax gap, research suggest that the substantial discretion available in GAAP provides managers the opportunity to manage their book income upward without affecting their taxable income. Moreover evidence suggests that companies were engaging in increasingly aggressive tax reporting practices. These combined evidence suggest that not all firms tradeoff financial and tax reporting decisions. That is, aggressive financial reporting firms are the same firms as those with aggressive tax reporting. Frank et al.(2009) report the results that financial reporting aggressiveness is positively related to tax reporting aggressiveness. But, in Korea, the ability to engage in both aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting depends on the availability of the tax reduction devices corresponding to the upward managed book income. This study examines whether firms that are aggressive for financial reporting purposes are also aggressive for tax reporting purposes. We define aggressive financial reporting as upward earnings management that may or may not be within the confines of GAAP and aggressive tax reporting as downward management of taxable income or tax burden through tax planning activities that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion. We use performance matched discretionary accruals as our proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness and industry-size adjusted GAAP ETR as our proxy for tax reporting aggressiveness. While most prior research considers financial and tax reporting decisions as exogenous choices, we model financial and tax reporting decisions as endogenously related. Specifically we use 2SLS to examine the endogenous relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. Using 2SLS regression and a sample of 3,626 firm-year data listed in Korean stock market from 2000 to 2009, we find evidence that financial reporting aggressiveness is negatively related to tax reporting aggressiveness in Korea. We also analyse the implications of financial and tax reporting aggressiveness for shareholder wealth by examining stock returns in the year of and in the year after the aggressiveness reporting behavior. We find that aggressive financial reporting generates higher contemporaneous returns and lower subsequent stock returns, consistent with the accrual anomaly research. But there is no evidence that the mispricing of tax reporting aggressiveness is concentrated in the highest quintile of financial reporting aggressiveness. This result does not agree with that of Frank et al.(2009). This study addresses a firm`s willingness to simultaneously engage in aggressive financial and tax reporting behavior and reports the result that financial reporting aggressiveness is negatively related to tax reporting aggressiveness in Korea. This study can be useful to both financial and tax regulators, and other stockholders, who have a vested interest in understanding the interaction of financial and tax reporting decisions.