기업집단 지배구조의 특성이 계열회사의 정보비대칭과 주가동조화에 미치는 영향

Title
기업집단 지배구조의 특성이 계열회사의 정보비대칭과 주가동조화에 미치는 영향
Other Titles
The Effects of Corporate Governance Characteristics on Information Asymmetry and Stock Price Synchronicity
Authors
조중석
Keywords
기업집단 지배구조; 출자건수; 출자지분율; 정보비대칭; 주가동조화; corporate governance; shareholding; ownership percentage; information asymmetry; stock price synchronicity
Issue Date
2015-08
Publisher
한국회계학회
Citation
회계학연구, v. 40, NO 4, Page. 285-326
Abstract
기업집단의 규모가 커지고 출자구조가 복잡해짐에 따라 기업집단 내 일부 기업의 사건이 계열회사로 전이되는 현상이 나타나기도 한다. 따라서 기업을 분석하기 위해서는 기업에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 기업집단의 특성을 고려하는 것이 필요하다. 하지만 출자구조를파악하고 직간접 영향력을 분석하는 것이 쉽지 않아 기업집단에 관한 정보가 부족한 실정이다. 뿐만 아니라 투자자들은 계열회사의 사건이 투자기업에 미치는 영향을 충분히 고려하여 투자의사결정을 내리기 어렵다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 기업집단 지배구조의 특성을 측정하고 계열회사의 정보비대칭과 주가 동조화에 영향을 미치는지 살펴보았다. 먼저, 기업집단 지배구조의 특성을 측정하기 위해 최충규(2009)에서 제시한 방법에 따라 연결망 밀도(network density)와 계급위세(rank prestige)를 출자건수와 출자지분율 기준으로 측정하였다. 연결망 밀도는 기업집단이 얼마나 응집성(cohesiveness)있게 얽혀 있는가를 나타내며 계급위세는 피출자 기준으로 계열회사의 기업집단 내 위세(prestige)를 나타낸다. 첫 번째로 기업집단 지배구조의 특성이 정보비대칭에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. (1) 연결망 밀도가 높은 기업집단에 속한 계열회사의 정보비대칭이 큰 것으로 나타났다. 따라서 출자구조가 복잡하게 얽혀있는 기업집단에 속하거나 출자건수 당 내부출자지분이 높은 기업집단에 속한 기업의 정보비대칭이 큰 것을 확인하였다. (2) 계급위세가 높은 기업은 정보비대칭이 큰 것으로 나타났다. 즉, 다수의 계열회사로부터 직간접 출자를 받을수록, 내부출자지분이 기업집단에서 차지하는 비중이 클수록 정보비대칭이 큰 것을 확인하였다. 두 번째로 기업집단 지배구조의 특성이 주가동조화에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. (1) 출자건수 기준 연결망 밀도가 높은 기업집단에 속한 계열회사의 주가동조화가 큰 것으로 나타났다. 하지만 출자지분율 기준 연결망 밀도와 주가동조화는 유의한 관계를 확인할 수 없었다. 따라서 출자구조가 복잡한 기업집단에 속한 기업의 주가동조화가 큰 것을 확인하였다. (2) 출자건수 기준 계급위세와 주가동조화는 유의한 관계를 확인할 수 없었다. 하지만 출자지분율 기준 계급위세가 높은 기업의 주가동조화가 큰 것으로 나타났다. 즉, 내부출자지분이 기업집단에서 차지하는 비중이 클수록 주가동조화가 큰 것을 확인하였다. 이러한 본 연구의 결과는 기업집단을 하나의 개체로 인식하고 계열회사 간 관계에 초점을 맞추어 측정한 기업집단 지배구조의 특성이 계열회사의 정보환경에 미치는 영향을 실증분석 했다는 점에서 의의가 있다. The objective of this paper is to find how the features of corporate governance affect the information environment of subsidiaries. One of the most interesting characteristics of conglomerates is its increasing complexity of corporate governance structure. As a result, transferring information content of one subsidiary to another subsidiary is more prevalent than in the past. Corporate governance, especially, shareholding structure in a conglomerate relates information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. That is, when the relative portion of shareholding in a conglomerate is high, information asymmetry increases because it is likely to be difficult for outside stakeholders (including potential stakeholders) to access firm-specific information of a particular subsidiary. In the meantime, market participants tend to exploit relatively easy-to-use information such as industry, capital market, and macro-economy data rather than hard-to-use firm-specific data when they make investment decisions. Thus complex shareholding structure of conglomerate comes out to increase both information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity simultaneously. First of all, following Choi (2009), we measure four characteristics of corporate governance. (1) Network density calculated by the number of shareholding (DENSITYlink) measures the complexity of ownership structure while (2) network density calculated by the ownership percentage (DENSITY ratio) measures the amount of shareholding in a conglomerate. In addition, (3) rank prestige calculated by the number of shareholding (RP ling)measures the number of subsidiaries which own the stock of particular subsidiary. Likewise, (4) rank prestige calculated by the ownership percentage (RP ratio) measures the relative amount of shareholding in a specific conglomerate. Then, to test for the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and information asymmetry, we exploit two information asymmetry measures: VOLA and SPREAD . VOLA is measured by volatility of daily stock returns and SPREAD is calculated by bid-ask spread, respectively. Next, to examine whether influence of corporate governance characteristics on stock price synchronicity, we exploit stock price synchronicity. It proxies for relative amount of firm-specific information influencing prices over the fiscal year. Higher stock price synchronicity implies that stock price of the firm is more vulnerable to the industry and capital market conditions. Our empirical predictions are as follows. First, we predict firms with higher DENSITY link increase information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. This is because conglomerates with complex ownership structure are more vulnerable to the economic events of subsidiaries and investors are barely accessible to the information across subsidiaries. Second, we predict firms with higher DENSITY ratio also increase information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. This is because information asymmetry comes from high DENSITY ratio keeps outside stakeholders from accessing internal information, and ultimately increases stock price synchronicity. Third, we predict firms with higher BP link increase information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. Subsidiaries are likely to use their dominance to control for the RP link firms and it will increase information asymmetry. Also, it is difficult task for naïve investors to analyze direct/indirect dominance. Both deepen information asymmetry and complexity will increase stock price synchronicity. Fourth, we predict firms with higher BP ratio increase information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. Firms with high BP ratio are more likely to be influenced by the conglomerate-level decision making because of its materiality of shareholding amount. Hence higher RP ratio implies increased information asymmetry due to the firm-specific and internal information, and ultimately, increased stock price synchronicity. Consistent with our prediction, the results are showing that (1) higher network density increases information asymmetry. Specifically, we find positive and significant relationship between DENSITY link and stock price synchronicity but we find no significant relationship between DENSITY ratio and stock price synchronicity. In addition, (2) higher rank prestige comes out to increase information asymmetry. Particularly, we find positive relationship between   RP ratio and stock price synchronicity; however, we find no significant relationship between RP link and stock price synchronicity. Overall, our empirical results support the prediction that the relative amount of shareholding in a conglomerate increases information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. In summary, I provide the empirical evidence for the corporate governance characteristics - information asymmetry - stock price synchronicity - puzzle. Our research sheds new light on the corporate governance literature and our findings are useful to both researchers and practitioners who are attempting to analyze financial performance and distress risk of subsidiaries with complex shareholding structure into conglomerate.
URI
http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=3349291http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11754/26820
ISSN
1229-3288; 2508-7193
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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS[S](경영전문대학원) > ETC
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