THE EX POST JV SUSTAINABILITY AND ACQUIRERS' PERFORMANCES UNDER THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF ADVERSE SELECTION PROBLEM

Title
THE EX POST JV SUSTAINABILITY AND ACQUIRERS' PERFORMANCES UNDER THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF ADVERSE SELECTION PROBLEM
Authors
임형록
Keywords
Joint Venture; Adverse Selection; Outside Option; Performance; Panel Analysis
Issue Date
2015-08
Publisher
ACAD ECONOMIC STUDIES
Citation
ECONOMIC COMPUTATION AND ECONOMIC CYBERNETICS STUDIES AND RESEARCH, v. 49, NO 2, Page. 249-267
Abstract
Concerning on JV (joint venture) dissolution, real option approach has focused on benefit-cost analysis. However, a latent risk in JV is adverse selection problem. If wrong partners are matched, parent firms, i.e., acquirers., can select an outside option to terminate JV Unfortunately, the outside option can be executed only after JV has begun. Our game theoretic model suggests that JV acquirers are more likely to be matched with low type partners as their expected ex ante JV value outweighs the one when they are matched with high type partners. By Bayesian belief update, acquirers are able to tell their partners' type posteriorly and then JV dissolution can occur Empirical tests based on US JV data reveal that only manufacturers gain from JV strategy and hierarchical ownership structure is helpful to enhancing acquirers' performances. It is interesting to see that unrelated JV rather than related JV contributes more and, differently from a conventional wisdom, international JV turns out to he as important as domestic. JV to acquirers' performances.
URI
http://www.ecocyb.ase.ro/Articles20152.htmhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11754/26785
ISSN
0424-267X; 1842-3264
Appears in Collections:
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS[S](경영전문대학원) > ETC
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Export
RIS (EndNote)
XLS (Excel)
XML


qrcode

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

BROWSE