The Structure of Political Institutions and Effectiveness of Corporate Political Lobbying

Title
The Structure of Political Institutions and Effectiveness of Corporate Political Lobbying
Authors
최성진
Keywords
corporate political activities; CPA; political systems; entry point; veto point; cross-country study
Issue Date
2015-03
Publisher
INFORMS
Citation
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, v. 26, NO 1, Page. 158-179
Abstract
This paper investigates how the structure of political institutions influences the effectiveness of corporate political lobbying by shaping the "veto points" and "entry points" that lobbying firms encounter and require, respectively, when attempting to influence public policies; in so doing, this study deepens our understanding of the strategic implications of institutional environments. Using large-sample and cross-country firm-level data, we find that the influence of firms' lobbying activities on public policies is weakened when there are tighter constraints generated as a result of greater political (partisan) competition and more subnational government tiers. We find that the negative association between the effectiveness of lobbying and political (partisan) competition is particularly pronounced in countries with lower electoral accountability and that the negative association between the effectiveness of lobbying and subnational government tiers is particularly pronounced in more centralized political systems.
URI
http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/orsc.2014.0936http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11754/23462
ISSN
1047-7039; 1526-5455
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0936
Appears in Collections:
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS[S](경영전문대학원) > ETC
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