A Study on North Korea's Strategy in Nuclear Disputes

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate North Korea’s main motivations for developing nuclear weapons. The findings will be helpful in analyzing North Korea’s ways or strategy to deal with the United States in the first and second nuclear dispute and also be helpful to formulate appropriate policy to solve the problem. In order to achieve the purpose, the theories and conceptual frameworks about why states develop nuclear weapons and small powers’ behavior in the international politics will be employed. This study finds that North Korea has been threatened by the U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons since the Korean War. In addition, North Korea, after the end of Cold War, also experienced security and economic problems that posed negative impacts on its survival. North Korea has attempted to solve these problems, but it only could reach reconciliation with South Korea by concluding the Basic Agreement in 1991. But North Korea could not open talks with the United States and also could not solve the problem with Japan. When the first nuclear dispute occurred, North Korea was able to bargain with the IAEA to conclude the safeguards agreement in case of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons withdrawal from South Korea. North Korea also could hold bilateral talks with the United States in which both sides signed the Agreed Framework in 1994 in order to solve the nuclear problem. North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for gaining security assurances and establishing economic and political ties with the United States. After the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 and the six-party talks were created to solve the second nuclear dispute, North Korea still desired to use nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip. But its motivations began to use nuclear weapons as deterrent against the U.S. threat after its conducting nuclear test on October 9, 2006. However, North Korea declared that it still desires to dismantle the nuclear weapons program in exchange for gaining security assurances and economic and political ties from the United States. The study indicates that North Korea used brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy as strategy in both nuclear disputes. But in the second nuclear dispute its strategy could not reach a desired outcome when compared with the first. The main reason is that the Bush administration has pursued a hard-line policy toward North Korea. In terms of scholarly contribution, in a case on North Korea nuclear proliferation, this study discovers that a small power could use nuclear weapons as a leverage to bargain with the United States, a great power, during the first nuclear crisis. In order to solve the North Korea’s nuclear problem, it is necessary to pay more attention to North Korea’s motivations to go nuclear. Therefore, the United States should formulate policies to solve the problems in which North Korea has been concerned about its survival, especially those about America’s threats and sanctions.