상법상 지배주주의 소수주식 강제매도청구에 관한 고찰

Abstract

국문요지

2011년 개정상법은 기업경영의 효율성을 제고할 목적으로 소수주주를 직접적으로 축출할 수 있는 지배주주의 소수주식 매도청구권 제도를 도입하였다. 이러한 소수주식 강제매도제도가 지배주주에게는 도움이 될 수 있으나 소수주주에게는 기대이익을 상실하게 하는 불이익을 가져올 수 있다. 따라서 이 제도의 합리적인 운용을 위해서는 행사 요건과 효과에 대한 제도적 개선을 통해 소수주주의 이익 침해를 최소화하면서도 지배주주의 이익과 조화를 이룰 수 있도록 하는 것이 필요하다. 이 논문에서는 그러한 관점에서 지배주주의 소수주식 강제매도의 행사요건과 효과 및 공정한 매매가액의 결정에 관해 검토·분석하고, 문제점과 개선방안을 제시하였다.

지배주주가 소수주식 강제매도청구권을 행사하려면, 발행주식총수의 95% 이상을 보유하여야 하고 경영상 목적을 달성하기 위해 필요한 경우라야 하며 주주총회의 승인을 얻어야 한다. 지배주주의 지분 계산에 있어 상장사 특례규정이나 다른 법령과 달리 특수관계인의 지분이 지배주주의 보유 지분 계산에 포함되지 않으므로 이 제도가 활용되기 위해서는 특수관계인의 지분도 지배주주 보유 지분 계산에 포함될 수 있도록 하는 입법적 개선이 필요하다. 또한 이 제도가 상장사에는 활용되기 어려울 것으로 전망되므로 이를 제대로 활용하려면 지배주주의 지분보유요건을 낮추는 것도 필요해 보인다. 경영상 목적 달성의 필요성에 대해서는 이를 엄격히 해석하면 제도의 유용성이 떨어지고, 이를 완화해 해석하면 지배주주의 권한 남용이 있을 수 있으므로 이에 대한 입법적 보완이 필요하다. 오히려 경영상 목적 요건을 삭제하고 미국 판례법 상의 총체적 공정성 기준을 도입하는 것이 바람직해 보인다.

지배주주의 적법한 매도청구가 있으면, 소수주주는 그들의 의사와 무관하게 보유주식 전부를 지배주주에게 매도해야 할 의무가 생기고, 지배주주는 그에 대해 매매대금을 지급할 의무를 진다. 그런데 언제 매매계약체결의 효력이 생기고 언제부터 매매대금 지급지체책임을 지는가에 대해서는 명확한 규정이 없으며, 제360조의26 제1항에서 매매가액을 지급하거나 공탁한 때에 주식이 이전된다는 규정을 두고 있을 뿐이다. 그래서 반대주주의 주식매수청구권에서와 마찬가지의 견해 대립이 있다. 이는 상법이 반대주주 주식매수청구와 소수주식 강제매도의 계약법적 효력과 회사법적 효력을 구분하고 있지 않기 때문인데, 외국의 입법례처럼 상법도 이러한 권리행사의 회사법적 효력과 가액결정에 관한 계약법적 효력을 분리시키도록 법령을 개정하는 것이 필요하다.

지배주주가 소수주주를 축출함에 있어 가장 핵심적인 문제는 자신의 의사에 반해 축출되는 소수주식에 대한 공정한 평가이며, 이를 통해 소수주주의 재산권에 대한 완전한 보상을 할 수 있다. 주식 매매가액에 대해 당사자 사이에 협의가 이루어지지 않으면 법원에 매매가액의 결정을 청구할 수 있다. 법원이 주식의 매매가액을 결정하는 경우에는 회사의 재산상태와 그 밖의 사정을 고려하여 공정한 가액을 산정하여야 한다. 지배주주의 주식매도청구권 행사의 경우도 반대주주의 주식매수청구권이 행사된 경우와 동일한 가치평가방법에 따를 것으로 예상된다. 다만, 반대주주 주식매수청구권의 경우는 반대주주가 회사에 잔류할 것을 선택할 수 있으나 소수주식 강제매도에서는 소수주주에게 그러한 선택의 여지가 없으므로 이러한 점이 매매가액 산정에 고려되어야 한다.

이 제도를 운용함에 있어서 지배주주의 권한남용을 방지하고, 기업경영의 효율성을 증대시키면서도 소수주주의 기대이익을 합리적으로 보장할 수 있는 제도적 방안이 있어야 하므로 이에 관한 법령의 개정과 이론적인 뒷받침이 필요하다.| ABSTRACT

A Study on Squeeze-Out Right of Controlling Shareholder under the Korean Commercial Act

Lee, Jong Geon Major in Commercial law Department of Law Graduate School Hanyang University

The revised Korean Commercial Act of 2011 introduced a squeeze-out institution which allows the controlling shareholder to directly eject minority shareholders for the purpose of improving corporate management efficiency. Such squeeze-out institution may benefit the controlling shareholder while it may also deprive the minority shareholders of their interests. Therefore, for the rational operation of the squeeze-out institution, it is necessary to reconcile the controlling shareholder's interests, while minimizing the infringement of minority shareholders' interests, through systematic improvement on the exercise requirements and effects of squeeze-out institution. This thesis reviews and analyzes the exercise requirements and effects of the squeeze-out by the controlling shareholder, determination of the fair share price, and then presents problems and remedies.

In order for the controlling shareholder to exercise the squeeze-out right, they should own 95% or more of the total number of issued shares, it is necessary to achieve business purpose and approval at the shareholders meeting should be obtained. Since the shares owned by the specially related parties are not included when calculating the total number of shares owned by the controlling shareholder, unlike the special provisions on the listed companies or other laws and regulations, legislative reform is required as to include the shares owned by the specially related parties in the controlling shareholder's shares for the squeeze-out institution to be utilized. Also, as the squeeze-out institution is not likely to be utilized by the listed companies, share ownership threshold needs to be lowered so that the institution shall be effectively applied. Legislative supplement is required with regard to determining necessity in terms of business purpose since strict interpretation would decrease flexibility of the institution while lenient interpretation may lead to abuse of the right by the controlling shareholder. It is rather desirable that the requirement on business purpose be deleted and the 'entire fairness standard' of the U.S. case law be adopted.

With lawful claim for sale of the shares by the controlling shareholder, minority shareholders are obliged to sell all of their shares to the controlling shareholder regardless of their intention and the controlling shareholder shall be liable to pay for the shares. However, there is no definite provision that clearly states when the sale and purchase agreement goes into effect and the payment obligation arises. Article 360 Paragraph (26) Subparagraph 1 simply states that the shares are transferred when the shares are paid for or deposited. Therefore there are same conflicting views as in appraisal right of the dissenting shareholders. This is because the revised Korean Commercial Act does not provide distinction between the effect based on contract law and the effect based on corporation law with regard to the dissenting shareholders' appraisal right and squeeze-out right. As may be seen in foreign legislation cases, the Korean Commercial Act also needs to distinguish the effect in accordance with corporation law as to exercising such rights and the effect in accordance with contract law as to determination of share price.

The core problem of ejecting minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder is fair valuation of the minorities’ shares which are driven out against their will. Which can fully compensate the property right of the minority shareholders. In case that the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders cannot come to an agreement on the share price, the related parties may request the court to determine share price. The court, when determining the share price, should consider the company’s financial status and other factors for fair valuation of the shares. It is expected that the same valuation method used for exercise of dissenting shareholders' appraisal right will also be applied to the exercise of the squeeze-out right. However, when determining the share price, it should be considered that the dissenting minority shareholders exercising appraisal right may opt to stay as shareholders, while minority shareholders being ejected through squeeze-out do not have such option.

In operating the squeeze-out institution, systematic measures are required which will prevent abuse of the right by the controlling shareholder, improve effectiveness of the corporate management and at the same time reasonably guarantee the minority shareholders’ interest. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the Korean Commercial Act in connection with such measures and theoretical support.; ABSTRACT

A Study on Squeeze-Out Right of Controlling Shareholder under the Korean Commercial Act

Lee, Jong Geon Major in Commercial law Department of Law Graduate School Hanyang University

The revised Korean Commercial Act of 2011 introduced a squeeze-out institution which allows the controlling shareholder to directly eject minority shareholders for the purpose of improving corporate management efficiency. Such squeeze-out institution may benefit the controlling shareholder while it may also deprive the minority shareholders of their interests. Therefore, for the rational operation of the squeeze-out institution, it is necessary to reconcile the controlling shareholder's interests, while minimizing the infringement of minority shareholders' interests, through systematic improvement on the exercise requirements and effects of squeeze-out institution. This thesis reviews and analyzes the exercise requirements and effects of the squeeze-out by the controlling shareholder, determination of the fair share price, and then presents problems and remedies.

In order for the controlling shareholder to exercise the squeeze-out right, they should own 95% or more of the total number of issued shares, it is necessary to achieve business purpose and approval at the shareholders meeting should be obtained. Since the shares owned by the specially related parties are not included when calculating the total number of shares owned by the controlling shareholder, unlike the special provisions on the listed companies or other laws and regulations, legislative reform is required as to include the shares owned by the specially related parties in the controlling shareholder's shares for the squeeze-out institution to be utilized. Also, as the squeeze-out institution is not likely to be utilized by the listed companies, share ownership threshold needs to be lowered so that the institution shall be effectively applied. Legislative supplement is required with regard to determining necessity in terms of business purpose since strict interpretation would decrease flexibility of the institution while lenient interpretation may lead to abuse of the right by the controlling shareholder. It is rather desirable that the requirement on business purpose be deleted and the 'entire fairness standard' of the U.S. case law be adopted.

With lawful claim for sale of the shares by the controlling shareholder, minority shareholders are obliged to sell all of their shares to the controlling shareholder regardless of their intention and the controlling shareholder shall be liable to pay for the shares. However, there is no definite provision that clearly states when the sale and purchase agreement goes into effect and the payment obligation arises. Article 360 Paragraph (26) Subparagraph 1 simply states that the shares are transferred when the shares are paid for or deposited. Therefore there are same conflicting views as in appraisal right of the dissenting shareholders. This is because the revised Korean Commercial Act does not provide distinction between the effect based on contract law and the effect based on corporation law with regard to the dissenting shareholders' appraisal right and squeeze-out right. As may be seen in foreign legislation cases, the Korean Commercial Act also needs to distinguish the effect in accordance with corporation law as to exercising such rights and the effect in accordance with contract law as to determination of share price.

The core problem of ejecting minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder is fair valuation of the minorities’ shares which are driven out against their will. Which can fully compensate the property right of the minority shareholders. In case that the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders cannot come to an agreement on the share price, the related parties may request the court to determine share price. The court, when determining the share price, should consider the company’s financial status and other factors for fair valuation of the shares. It is expected that the same valuation method used for exercise of dissenting shareholders' appraisal right will also be applied to the exercise of the squeeze-out right. However, when determining the share price, it should be considered that the dissenting minority shareholders exercising appraisal right may opt to stay as shareholders, while minority shareholders being ejected through squeeze-out do not have such option.

In operating the squeeze-out institution, systematic measures are required which will prevent abuse of the right by the controlling shareholder, improve effectiveness of the corporate management and at the same time reasonably guarantee the minority shareholders’ interest. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the Korean Commercial Act in connection with such measures and theoretical support.