재무분석가 수와 조세회피

Abstract

본 연구는 재무분석가 수와 조세회피 간의 관계를 분석하였다. 재무분석가는 각자가 분석하는 기업에 대한 공식·비공식적인 정보를 수집하고 분석하여 시장참여자들에게 일반 투자자보다 더욱 전문적이고 합리적인 정보를 제공함으로써 정보의 매개체의 역할을 한다. 자본시장에 재무분석가가 제공하는 기업의 정보가 증가한다면, 경영자가 사적 편익을 추구하려는 행동을 감시하게되어 조세회피의 수준이 낮아지게 될 것이다. 재무분석가 수에 따른 조세회피와의 관계는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 해당 기업을 분석하는 재무분석가의 수가 많을수록 경영자와 지배주주에 대한 모니터링 기능이 강화되어 조세회피의 수준이 낮아질 것이다. 둘째, 재무분석가 수가 조세회피에 미치는 부정적인 효과는 지배구조가 취약한 기업의 경우 그렇지 않은 기업보다 재무분석가가 가지는 모니터링 효과가 증대되어 조세회피를 억제하는 역할이 증가될 것이다. 셋째, 재무분석가 수가 조세회피에 미치는 음(-)의 효과는 정보비대칭이 높은 기업의 경우 그렇지 않은 기업보다 재무분석가의 감시기능이 증가되어 조세회피의 수준이 낮아질 것이다. 본 연구의 분석기간은 2001년부터 2010년까지이고, 비금융 상장기업을 대상으로 실증분석을 수행하였다. 조세회피는 현금유효법인세율, 유효법인세율, 재량적 재무이익과 세무이익의 차이(Book-Tax Differences: BTD)를 이용하여 분석하였고, 재무분석가 수는 당기에 투자의견을 제시한 재무분석가 수의 자연로그를 취하여 측정하였다. 기업지배구조는 기관투자자 지분율, 외국인투자자 지분율을, 정보비대칭은 매수-매도호가 차이(Bid-Ask Spread)을 이용하였다. 실증분석 결과, 해당 기업을 분석하는 재무분석가 수와 조세회피는 음(-)의 관계로 나타났다. 시장참여자들에게 합리적이고 전문적인 정보를 제공하는 재무분석가가 많을수록 경영자와 지배주주들에 대한 모니터링 역할이 강화되어 조세회피의 수준을 감소시키는 것으로 추정된다. 또한 재무분석가 수와 조세회피의 부정적인 관계는 기업지배구조가 취약한 기업일수록 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 기업지배구조가 취약할수록 재무분석가가 가지는 경영자의 사적 편익 추구 행동에 대한 모니터링 기능이 증대되어 조세회피를 억제하는 역할이 증가하는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 마지막으로 재무분석가 수와 조세회피의 음(-)의 관계는 정보비대칭이 높은 기업일수록 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 정보비대칭이 높을수록 많은 재무분석가로 인한 경영자에 대한 모니터링 기능이 활성화되어 조세회피를 억제하는 역할이 강화되는 것을 의미한다. 본 연구는 우리나라 기업의 재무분석가 수와 조세회피 간의 유의적인 음(-)의 관계를 다양한 조세회피 측정치를 이용하여 검증하였다. 또한 지배구조가 취약하고 정보비대칭이 높은 기업의 경우 그렇지 않은 기업보다 재무분석가 수가 조세회피 수준에 미치는 부정적인 영향이 강화된다는 점을 보여주었다. 이러한 결과는 재무분석가 수가 조세회피의 한 가지 결정요인이 될 수 있다는 실증적인 증거를 제시하는 것으로, 투자자, 경영자, 과세당국 및 이해관계자에게 유용한 시사점을 제공할 것으로 기대한다.| This study investigates the impact of analyst coverage on corporate tax avoidance. Prior literature suggests two alternative views on tax avoidance in empirical tax research in general. Traditionally, the first view is that managers undertake tax avoidance for the purposer of reducing corporate tax obligations only. The other view is that opportunistic managers may exploit the obfuscatory nature of tax avoidance tax to mask rent extraction : agency perspective of tax avoidance. This study, in agency perspective, suggests that analyst coverage plays the monitoring role in corporate tax avoidance. This study defined tax avoidance as the reduction of explicit tax payments over time through all means of income reported to shareholders (Dyreng et al. 2008). To measure tax avoidance, I use CASH ETR, GAAP ETR, discretionary BTD. CASH ETR measured by taxes paid divided by pretax income, and GAAP ETR measured by tax expense divided by pretax income. Discretionary BTD is in Desai and Dharmapala(2005). To test hypotheses, this study regressed analyst coverage on tax avoidance variables and other control variables. To this end, this study employs CASH ETR, GAAP ETR and discretionary BTD as a proxy for tax avoidance. Analyst coverage variable measures using a natural logarithm of numbers of analyst. Drawing on factor analysis to choose governance variables, this work focuses on these two governance dimensions based on arguments and evidence in previous literature that shows institutional holdings and foreign investor ownership. The Bid-Ask Spread variable used in Korean Stock Exchange data. The other financial variables used in the analyses are collected from TS-2000 and DataGuide Pro database. Sample of this study consists of the firms listed on Korean Stock Exchange over the period of 2001 to 2010, and the sample size is 3,034 firm-year observations for CASH ETR. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, I test the relation between tax avoidance and analyst coverage. This result shows that analyst coverage has negative associations with corporate tax avoidance. Second, I examine how corporate governance impacts the association between tax avoidance and analyst coverage, using interaction between analyst coverage and corporate governance. Third, I examine how information asymmetry impacts the association between tax avoidance and analyst coverage, using interaction between analyst coverage and information asymmetry. It suggests that the monitoring view emphasizes the mitigating effect between analyst coverage and tax avoidance. Furthermore, this is consistent with the notion that strong corporate governance facilitates and weak information asymmetry the monitoring of managerial actions and thus alleviates outside investors' concern about hidden agency costs associated with tax avoidance when firms followed by more analysts. This study is the first to document evidence that analyst coverage impacts to tax avoidance in Korea. Also this study that tax avoidance could deteriorate analyst coverage provides an important consideration in corporate tax decisions.; This study investigates the impact of analyst coverage on corporate tax avoidance. Prior literature suggests two alternative views on tax avoidance in empirical tax research in general. Traditionally, the first view is that managers undertake tax avoidance for the purposer of reducing corporate tax obligations only. The other view is that opportunistic managers may exploit the obfuscatory nature of tax avoidance tax to mask rent extraction : agency perspective of tax avoidance. This study, in agency perspective, suggests that analyst coverage plays the monitoring role in corporate tax avoidance. This study defined tax avoidance as the reduction of explicit tax payments over time through all means of income reported to shareholders (Dyreng et al. 2008). To measure tax avoidance, I use CASH ETR, GAAP ETR, discretionary BTD. CASH ETR measured by taxes paid divided by pretax income, and GAAP ETR measured by tax expense divided by pretax income. Discretionary BTD is in Desai and Dharmapala(2005). To test hypotheses, this study regressed analyst coverage on tax avoidance variables and other control variables. To this end, this study employs CASH ETR, GAAP ETR and discretionary BTD as a proxy for tax avoidance. Analyst coverage variable measures using a natural logarithm of numbers of analyst. Drawing on factor analysis to choose governance variables, this work focuses on these two governance dimensions based on arguments and evidence in previous literature that shows institutional holdings and foreign investor ownership. The Bid-Ask Spread variable used in Korean Stock Exchange data. The other financial variables used in the analyses are collected from TS-2000 and DataGuide Pro database. Sample of this study consists of the firms listed on Korean Stock Exchange over the period of 2001 to 2010, and the sample size is 3,034 firm-year observations for CASH ETR. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, I test the relation between tax avoidance and analyst coverage. This result shows that analyst coverage has negative associations with corporate tax avoidance. Second, I examine how corporate governance impacts the association between tax avoidance and analyst coverage, using interaction between analyst coverage and corporate governance. Third, I examine how information asymmetry impacts the association between tax avoidance and analyst coverage, using interaction between analyst coverage and information asymmetry. It suggests that the monitoring view emphasizes the mitigating effect between analyst coverage and tax avoidance. Furthermore, this is consistent with the notion that strong corporate governance facilitates and weak information asymmetry the monitoring of managerial actions and thus alleviates outside investors' concern about hidden agency costs associated with tax avoidance when firms followed by more analysts. This study is the first to document evidence that analyst coverage impacts to tax avoidance in Korea. Also this study that tax avoidance could deteriorate analyst coverage provides an important consideration in corporate tax decisions.