간헐적 재난의 효과적인 관리를 위한 협력적 네트워크의 역할

Abstract

간헐적 재난은 발생 가능성을 예측하기 어렵기 때문에 발생했을 경우에 정부의 신속한 대응이 매우 중요하다. 그러나 최근 몇 년 간 발생했던 간헐적 재난에 대한 정부의 늑장대응으로 인해 많은 인명과 재산상의 피해가 발생했지만 간헐적 재난의 관리에 대한 정부와 학계의 심도 있는 연구는 매우 부족했다. 세월호 참사 이후 정부는 2014년 11월에 국민안전처를 출범시켰음에도 불구하고 2015년 5월에 발생했던 메르스 사태 때 정부는 역시나 초기 대응에 실패하였다. 그 결과 국내에서는 전 세계에서 두 번째로 많은 186명의 메르스 확진 환자와 38명의 사망자가 발생했다. 따라서 본 연구는 간헐적 재난의 한 사례인 국내 메르스 사태에 대한 정부의 대응 방식을 분석하고, 향후에 발생할 수 있는 간헐적 재난의 관리를 위한 정책 대안을 제시하고자 하였다. 또한 간헐적 재난의 효과적인 관리를 위해서 협력적 네트워크를 제시함으로써 그 역할은 무엇이고, 어떻게 네트워크를 관리할 것이며, 궁극적으로 어떻게 재난을 대처하고 극복할 것인지를 연구하였다. 그러나 협력적 네트워크와 간헐적 재난의 효과적인 관리를 어떻게 측정할지에 대한 문제가 있었다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 선행 문헌검토를 통해 협력적 네트워크 측정을 위한 변수 네 가지를 도출하였고, 간헐적 재난의 효과적인 관리가 무엇인지 구체적이지 않은 문제는 협력적 네트워크를 토대로 재난관리가 잘 되었던 사례와 잘 안된 사례의 비교 분석을 실시하였다. 2014년 미국의 메르스 대응 사례와 2003년 한국의 사스 대응 사례를 잘 되었던 사례로서 선정하였고, 2015년 한국의 메르스 대응 사례를 잘 안된 사례로 선정하였다. 협력적 네트워크 측정 변수인 신뢰, 공유된 목표, 네트워크 관리역량, 네트워크 리더 등 네 가지 변수를 이용해서 세 가지 사례를 분석했고, 또한 사례의 비교 분석을 통해서 간헐적인 재난의 효과적인 관리가 무엇인지 연구하였다. 분석한 결과 첫째, 한국의 메르스 대응 사례에서는 초기에 보건당국이 정보를 비공개해서 관계 정부 부처, 지방자치단체, 국민들의 보건당국에 대한 신뢰가 형성되지 않았다. 그러나 미국의 메르스 대응과 한국의 사스 대응 때는 유입 전부터 방역대책을 구축하였고 유입 후에는 신속한 정보 공개와 철저한 격리 조치를 통해 신뢰를 구축하였다. 둘째, 메르스 대응을 위한 매뉴얼이 유입 전에 갖춰지지 않았고, 감염병 위기관리 표준매뉴얼은 미흡한 부분이 많았기 때문에 메르스 대응 기관들 간에 목표가 공유되기 어려웠다. 반면에 미국 질병통제예방센터(CDC)는 메르스 유입 9개월 전에 메르스 대응 매뉴얼을 배포함으로써 목표가 공유될 수 있었고, 한국의 사스 대응 때도 사전에 배포된 사스 대응 매뉴얼을 토대로 정부 기관, 지방자치단체, 국민들 간에 공유된 목표가 형성될 수 있었다. 셋째, 한국의 메르스 대응을 위해 초기에 구성되었던 네트워크는 없었고, 질병관리본부와 보건복지부의 조직역량은 부족했다. 미국은 감염병이 유입되면 연방정부, 주정부, CDC가 협력적 네트워크를 구성해서 대응하고, CDC의 조직역량은 매우 우수하다. 한국은 사스 방역을 위해서 정부 기관들과 시·도 검역소, 보건소가 네트워크를 구성해서 대응했지만 민간 의료기관들은 비협조적이었고, 당시에 감염병을 전문적으로 예방하고 대처할 정부 기관은 없었다. 넷째, 메르스 대응을 위해서 보건복지부가 네트워크 리더가 되어야 했지만 그 역할을 제대로 수행하지 않았다. 메르스 사태 초기에 네트워크 리더를 질병관리본부장에게 맡겼고, 감염병 위기경보 수준(관심-주의-경계-심각)을 메르스 종식 때까지 주의 단계로 유지했기 때문에 중앙재난안전대책본부가 가동될 수 없었다. 반면에 미국은 CDC가 메르스 유입 전과 후에 네트워크 리더의 역할을 했고, 한국은 국무총리가 나서서 사스 유입 전부터 방역을 지휘하였다. 본 연구를 통해서 간헐적 재난의 효과적인 관리를 위해서 협력적 네트워크가 구성되어야 한다는 점과 함께 강력한 권한과 전문성을 갖춘 네트워크 리더의 존재와 신속한 정보 공개가 중요하다는 점을 밝혔다. 또한 세분화된 매뉴얼의 구축과 질병관리본부의 조직역량 강화의 필요성을 밝혔다. 그러나 본 연구는 사례의 수가 많지 않고, 분석을 위해 2차 자료만 사용했으며, 수치화된 객관적 데이터가 없다는 한계가 있다.|In case of the infrequent emergency, the government should respond promptly because it is especially hard to predict the occurrence. However, the government's response to the infrequent emergency that have occurred in recent years has caused many human and property damages, but the in-depth study of government and academia on the management of the infrequent emergency has been lacking. Although the government launched the Ministry of Public Safety and Security in November 2014, controlling the MERS-CoV(Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus), which occurred in the South Korea, in May 2015, was failed again in the early stages. As a result, MERS-CoV affected 186 individuals and claimed 37 lives in short span of time and it was the second largest in the world. Therefore, this study analyzed the government's response to the domestic MERS-CoV as an example of the infrequent emergency and suggested policy alternatives for future infrequent emergency management. In addition, this study have proposed a collaborative network for effective management of the infrequent emergency, studied what roles are, how to manage the network, and ultimately how to cope with and overcome the infrequent emergency. However, there were problems about how to measure the effective management of the collaborative network and the infrequent emergency. For this reason, four variables were derived through the review of prior literature for measuring the collaborative network and a comparative analysis of the cases was conducted for measuring the effective management of infrequent emergency. The USA’s case of MERS in 2014 and the Korea’s case of SARS(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 were selected as good cases. On the other hand, the case of Korea's MERS in 2015 was selected as a bad case. Three cases were analyzed by using four variables for measuring the collaborative network: trust, goal consensus, network competency, and network leader. In addition, the effective management of infrequent emergency was studied through comparative analysis of cases. The results are as follows. Firstly, in the case of Korea's response for the MERS, trust for the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s preventive measures against epidemics was not formed because the health authorities did not reveal the information of patients and visited hospitals in the early stage. However, in response to the MERS in the USA and the SARS in Korea, countermeasures have been established before the outbreak and after the outbreak, trust was built because of rapid information disclosure and thorough quarantine. Secondly, it was difficult to share the goals among the MERS response organizations owing to the manual for responding the MERS was not prepared before the outbreak and the standard manual for the infectious disease was inadequate. On the other hand, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) was able to share its goal by distributing the MERS response manual nine months before the outbreak of the MERS. In addition, goal consensus was possible in Korea on account of previously published SARS response manual. Thirdly, there was not constructed networks for responding the MERS, and the organization competencies of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(KCDC) and the Ministry of Health and Welfare were lacking. In the United States, federal governments, state governments, and CDC construct a collaborative network when infectious diseases are introduced, and CDC's organization competence is great. In Korea, government agencies, city and province quarantine stations, and community health centers formed a network to respond to SARS, but civilian medical institutions were uncooperative, and there were not government agencies to prevent and deal with infectious diseases professionally at that time. Lastly, the Ministry of Health and Welfare needed to be the network leader to respond to the MERS, but did not perform its role properly. In the early days of MERS, the network leader was the director of the KCDC and the central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters could not be operated because the level of the epidemic crisis alert(Blue-Yellow-Orange-Red) was maintained as Yellow until the end of the MERS. On the other hand, CDC played a role as the network leader in the USA before and after the introduction of the MERS, and the Prime Minister of Korea was in command for preventive measures against SARS before and after the outbreak of the SARS. In this study, it is shown that not only the collaborative network should be constructed for effective management of the infrequent emergency, but the existence of the network leader with strong authority and expertise and rapid disclosure of information are also important. It also revealed the necessity of making detailed manuals and strengthening the organizational competencies of the KCDC. However, this study is limited in that there are not many cases, only secondary data are used for analysis, and there are not numerically objective data.; In case of the infrequent emergency, the government should respond promptly because it is especially hard to predict the occurrence. However, the government's response to the infrequent emergency that have occurred in recent years has caused many human and property damages, but the in-depth study of government and academia on the management of the infrequent emergency has been lacking. Although the government launched the Ministry of Public Safety and Security in November 2014, controlling the MERS-CoV(Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus), which occurred in the South Korea, in May 2015, was failed again in the early stages. As a result, MERS-CoV affected 186 individuals and claimed 37 lives in short span of time and it was the second largest in the world. Therefore, this study analyzed the government's response to the domestic MERS-CoV as an example of the infrequent emergency and suggested policy alternatives for future infrequent emergency management. In addition, this study have proposed a collaborative network for effective management of the infrequent emergency, studied what roles are, how to manage the network, and ultimately how to cope with and overcome the infrequent emergency. However, there were problems about how to measure the effective management of the collaborative network and the infrequent emergency. For this reason, four variables were derived through the review of prior literature for measuring the collaborative network and a comparative analysis of the cases was conducted for measuring the effective management of infrequent emergency. The USA’s case of MERS in 2014 and the Korea’s case of SARS(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 were selected as good cases. On the other hand, the case of Korea's MERS in 2015 was selected as a bad case. Three cases were analyzed by using four variables for measuring the collaborative network: trust, goal consensus, network competency, and network leader. In addition, the effective management of infrequent emergency was studied through comparative analysis of cases. The results are as follows. Firstly, in the case of Korea's response for the MERS, trust for the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s preventive measures against epidemics was not formed because the health authorities did not reveal the information of patients and visited hospitals in the early stage. However, in response to the MERS in the USA and the SARS in Korea, countermeasures have been established before the outbreak and after the outbreak, trust was built because of rapid information disclosure and thorough quarantine. Secondly, it was difficult to share the goals among the MERS response organizations owing to the manual for responding the MERS was not prepared before the outbreak and the standard manual for the infectious disease was inadequate. On the other hand, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) was able to share its goal by distributing the MERS response manual nine months before the outbreak of the MERS. In addition, goal consensus was possible in Korea on account of previously published SARS response manual. Thirdly, there was not constructed networks for responding the MERS, and the organization competencies of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(KCDC) and the Ministry of Health and Welfare were lacking. In the United States, federal governments, state governments, and CDC construct a collaborative network when infectious diseases are introduced, and CDC's organization competence is great. In Korea, government agencies, city and province quarantine stations, and community health centers formed a network to respond to SARS, but civilian medical institutions were uncooperative, and there were not government agencies to prevent and deal with infectious diseases professionally at that time. Lastly, the Ministry of Health and Welfare needed to be the network leader to respond to the MERS, but did not perform its role properly. In the early days of MERS, the network leader was the director of the KCDC and the central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters could not be operated because the level of the epidemic crisis alert(Blue-Yellow-Orange-Red) was maintained as Yellow until the end of the MERS. On the other hand, CDC played a role as the network leader in the USA before and after the introduction of the MERS, and the Prime Minister of Korea was in command for preventive measures against SARS before and after the outbreak of the SARS. In this study, it is shown that not only the collaborative network should be constructed for effective management of the infrequent emergency, but the existence of the network leader with strong authority and expertise and rapid disclosure of information are also important. It also revealed the necessity of making detailed manuals and strengthening the organizational competencies of the KCDC. However, this study is limited in that there are not many cases, only secondary data are used for analysis, and there are not numerically objective data.