후진타오-시진핑 시기 중국의 대북정책 변화 연구 : 비핵화와 경제협력 정책을 중심으로

Abstract

이 연구는 2000년대 이후 중국의 대북정책과 북중관계가 미중(美中)관계의 변화를 비롯한 대내외 변인(變因)에 의해 크게 영향을 받았다는 가정을 검증-규명하고자 한 것이다. 연구 목표는 두 가지다. 첫째, 후진타오-시진핑 시기 대내외 변인이 중국의 대북정책, 특히 비핵화정책을 어떻게 바꾸었는지 확인하는 문제이다. 둘째, 중국은 핵보유를 통해 군사동맹에서 멀어지는 북한에 대한 영향력을 확보하기 위해 어떠한 대북 경제협력 정책을 펼쳤는가 하는 문제이다. 연구 결과, 후진타오 시기와 시진핑 시기 중국은 자신의 종합국력의 성장과 국가목표의 변화, 미중관계의 변화 등에 따라 ‘전략적 자산’으로서 북한의 가치를 다르게 평가하고 대북정책도 조정한 것으로 나타났다. 이를 구체적으로 살펴보면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 미중관계가 협력 지향적이고 대외변수가 국내변수에 큰 영향을 주지 않을 때(후진타오 1기와 시진핑 1기), 중국은 비핵화 원칙을 강조하면서 ‘북핵 제지’에 상당한 역량을 집중하였으며, 그에 따라 북중관계도 냉각되었다. 반면 미중관계가 대결 지향적이거나 남북한 관계에 변화가 일어나는 등 대외변수가 국내 변수를 압도할 때(후진타오 2기와 시진핑 2기), 중국은 북한의 ‘전략적 자산’ 가치를 중시하여 갈등을 접고 ‘혈맹관계’를 복원하였다. 둘째, 후진타오 정부에서 시작되어 시진핑 정부까지 이어진 적극적 대북 경협정책의 결과, 북한 경제가 중국에 크게 의존하게 됨으로써 경협은 중국의 대북 영향력을 강화하는 지렛대(leverage)가 되었다. 미국 등 국제사회의 대북제재가 강화된 2017년 이후 시진핑 정부의 ‘경제제재 동참 카드’는, 북한의 높은 대중 경제의존도로 인해, 김정은에게 매우 아픈 카드로 작용하였다. 경협이 북한에 ‘당근’이자 ‘채찍’의 작용을 하게 된 것이다. 이러한 특성으로 볼 때, 향후 미중간 패권경쟁이 격화될 경우, 중국은 북한의 전략적 자산 가치를 더욱 높이 평가하고 북한을 적극 포용하는 정책을 펼칠 것으로 예상된다. 이는 북핵문제 해결을 더욱 어렵게 만들 것이다. 아울러 중국은 대북 영향력 강화를 위해 북한과의 경제협력을 확대할 것이며, 북한은 ‘위안화 경제권’ 편입이 가속화될 것으로 예상된다.; This study aims to verify and investigate the hypothesis that China’s North Korea policies and North Korea-China relations after 2000 were significantly influenced by internal and external variables including the shift in US-China relations. The two objectives of this study are as follows: first, how the domestic and foreign variables in the Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping era changed China’s North Korea policies, the denuclearization policies in particular; second, what kind of economic policies toward North Korea did China execute in order to secure their leverage on North Korea, who continues to distance itself from the military alliance through the possession of nuclear weapons. The results of this study indicate that during the Hu Jintao era and Xi Jinping era, China differently assessed North Korea’s value as a ‘strategic asset’ and thus adjusted the North Korea policies in accordance to its own growth in comprehensive national power, changes in national objectives and US-China relations, etc.. This is further elaborated in the following two aspects. First, when the US-China relationship was cooperation-oriented and the external variables did not affect the internal variables as significantly (first terms of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping), China focused on restraining North Korea’s nuclear programs with considerable capacity, emphasizing the ‘denuclearization’ principle. As a result, North Korea-China relations went cold. However, when the US-China relationship was competition-oriented or external variables such as big changes in the South and North Korea relations overpowered the internal variables (second terms of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping), China highly valued North Korea as a ‘strategic asset’. It was confirmed that this lead to the immediate cease of conflicts and the restoration of the ‘blood alliance’. At this time, China frequently held summit meetings with North Korea and highlighted their ‘blood-sealed relationship’ and ‘shared destiny’, which they aimed to use against the US. Second, the active economic cooperation with North Korea that started from Hu Jintao and continued through Xi Jinping made North Korea’s economy extremely dependent on China, serving as a leverage that strengthens China’s influences over North Korea. Especially under the enforced international sanctions on North Korea, ‘economic sanctions’ by the Xi Jinping government were critical to Kim Jong-un due to North Korea’s high level of economic dependence on China. Kim executed four nuclear experiments in five years since Xi Jinping took office, undaunted by the pressures from China, but agreed to talk in just a year when the Chinese government joined Trump in tough sanctions against North Korea since 2017. In this sense, China’s economic cooperation policies for North Korea were both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to North Korea. China’s demands on denuclearization and economic cooperation policies are complementary and synergistic within the big frame of North Korea policies. Considering these aspects, as the competition for hegemony aggravates between the US and China, it is expected of China to value highly of North Korea as a strategic asset and carry out engagement policies towards North Korea. This will significantly impede the process of resolving North Korean nuclear issues. Furthermore, China is predicted to continuously expand the economic cooperation with North Korea, which had been actively executed since the Northeast Development Strategy(東北振興戰略) in 2003. This will accelerate North Korea’s incorporation into the ‘Yuan Bloc’. Therefore South Korea should take into consideration these aspects of North Korea-China relations when carrying out North Korea policies and diplomacy towards China. Particularly under the circumstances in which the US-China competition for hegemony is being aggravated, South Korea should be on guard against wishful thinking towards China and North Korea. The foreign affairs and national security strategies to be drawn should assume the worst scenario, which would include the consolidation of North Korea-China alliance and the completion of North Korea’s nuclear armament.